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Preface
Universities UK represents 133 universities and higher education institutions in the UK.
It is the primary leadership organisation for the UK’s universities, working to support
the long-term health of the sector. We aim to serve the interests of a wide group of
stakeholders – students, researchers and academic staff, employers, the government,
and the wider public. 
This submission to the Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and Student
Finance sets out the long-term vision of Universities UK for the student funding system
in England. The material contained in this document also has clear implications for
Scotland, Wales, and Northern Ireland, and is thus relevant for the whole of the UK. 
The analysis and recommendations presented in the document have been the 
subject of a great deal of debate within Universities UK over a period of many months.
This includes extensive consultation with all 133 institutions in Universities UK’s
membership – in meetings with members, through the organisation’s formal
committee structure, and in external events and discussions with key stakeholders. 
The material is thus wide-ranging in its scope – considering the full range of issues
which have entered the public sphere in relation to student funding, and engages 
with potential policy options, even where we believe they are not viable or desirable. 
The work was led by a task group chaired by Professor Glynis Breakwell, 
Vice Chancellor of the University of Bath, with members comprising Professors 
David Greenaway, Paul O’Prey, Shirley Pearce, Geoffrey Petts, Andrew Wathey 
and Geoff Whitty, Vice Chancellors of the universities of Nottingham, Roehampton,
Loughborough, Westminster, Northumbria and Director of the Institute of 
Education respectively. 
This submission represents the consensus view of Universities UK’s membership, 
as endorsed by Universities UK’s Board on 14 May 2010. 
In preparing this submission, we have been mindful of the pressures and challenges
which are presented by the current public funding environment – pressures which 
are likely to persist for a decade or more. Thus, in setting out our long-term vision, we
have also taken account of the position we are in now, and the constraints this inevitably
places on the recommendations and proposals we can make. As a result, we make
clear proposals on reforms to the student funding system which are needed now, and
for which a clear and decisive case can be made. In other areas, the evidence is not 
as clear-cut, and in these cases we set out a discussion of the issues involved, and the
potential consequences of making certain policy choices over others. 
A great many people have been consulted on in the course of preparing this submission,
and we are grateful for all the input which has been received. In particular, we would
like to thank the Chair and members of the task group, and also Alissa Goodman, 
Gill Wyness, and colleagues at the Institute for Fiscal Studies for their advice, and for
carrying out the analytic work which underpins a number of our recommendations 
in relation to funding for full-time undergraduate students.
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21 The Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and Student Finance led by 
Lord Browne has come at a critical time. Demand for university places is exceptionally
high, while universities face a very uncertain future in terms of their funding. And 
while it is acknowledged that the reforms introduced as a result of the 2004 legislation
have been broadly positive overall, there remains much work to be done in addressing
flaws in the current student finance system, and ensuring that we have a funding
framework which is durable for the future and fairer for all students. 
2 Universities serve the needs of students, the economy, and wider society. They are 
net contributors to the economy, deliver the skills and knowledge needed for future
economic success, and also generate substantial public benefits.1 In all of these
spheres, requirements and expectations are changing rapidly. Universities have shown
themselves to be adaptable and responsive to increasing demands in the past, but
sustainable funding is necessary in order to ensure this is the case in the future. 
3 Universities operate within a complex ecosystem of regulation and accountability,
working with a large number of stakeholders, and exercising a high degree of 
autonomy in their governance and management. They receive state funding, but 
also operate under competitive pressure – more so now than ever before. These
features make the university sector one of the UK’s greatest assets, delivering 
world-leading education for students both here and abroad. This is why we do not
propose wholesale restructuring of the higher education sector in our submission – 
but rather, suggest that evolution of the current system through a rolling programme 
of reform is what is required.
4 The proposals we make in this submission seek to preserve and enhance what is 
best about the current funding system for higher education and student finance, while
addressing some of its most serious problems. We aim to describe a system which 
is sustainable, accountable, and which can provide effectively for the future needs 
of successive generations of students. 
5 Our proposals for reform, and discussion of the issues and options, are grouped into 
the following areas: general proposals; the graduate contribution framework; student
finance; public funding; and managing student numbers. Where we believe the
evidence is decisive, we have set out clear proposals. Where the arguments are less
clear-cut, we have set out a discussion of the issues and possible policy options,
highlighting the strengths and weaknesses of the potential choices available. We have
also indicated the areas where we believe further analysis and evidence is required
before any firm policy recommendations can be made. Our main recommendations 
and points of discussion are summarised below.
Executive summary
1
See The impact of universities
on the UK economy,
Universities UK, 
November 2009.
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General
There should be a rolling programme of reform of the student funding system in
England, carried out over an appropriate timescale (at least 5–7 years).
Any reforms should evolve from the current system, which is fundamentally strong –
there is no case for wholesale revision of the structure of the system.
The regulatory and accountability framework supporting higher education needs to 
be rethought, in terms of delivering desired outcomes. These we define as: increasing
participation and social mobility; delivering a high-quality student experience; and
making efficient use of public and private resources.
Graduate contribution
The current fee should be renamed a ‘graduate contribution’, and the progressive
nature of a private graduate contribution towards the cost of teaching should be more
effectively communicated.
The unit of funding prior to implementation of the recent cuts to the higher education
budget in England should be restored as soon as possible.
The graduate contribution towards the cost of higher education should increase 
over time, up to a maximum level. We can envisage a position in future in which this
upper limit is appreciably higher than its current level, but we propose that it should
remain regulated.
Over time, the maximum graduate contribution should be set at a level which, in
combination with other income sources, allows universities to recover the costs 
of their teaching provision, and develop appropriate pricing and financial strategies.
The quality and accessibility of public information relating to higher education, and 
the operation of the information, advice and guidance system should continue to be
improved. These improvements should reflect what prospective students themselves
state would be most useful.
The impact of increasing the graduate contribution on students, graduates, institutions,
and government policy aims should be carefully and regularly monitored. The interests
of students need to be protected in any new system, and mechanisms put in place,
which mitigate the potential negative impact on students’ selection of institution arising
from a higher graduate contribution.
Student finance 
The resource costs (RAB charge) of the current student loan system should be reduced.
This could be achieved through a number of means:
i A real rate of interest should be introduced, which is set at least at the government’s
cost of borrowing (currently 2.2%), but below what would be considered to be 
a commercial rate of interest.
ii Consideration should be given to increasing the repayment rate on student loans 
from its current level of 9%, but only in conjunction with other changes.
iii Consideration should also be given to extending the repayment period on the loan, 
but only in conjunction with other changes.
4The effects of introducing these changes should be monitored over time. This includes
monitoring the impact on participation by particular groups of students, as well as the
impact on individual institutions.
At least a proportion of any savings generated by reducing the RAB charge on student
loans should be recycled into the higher education system.
There should be a maximum guaranteed government-backed, income-contingent 
loan available for students to meet their graduate contribution. This should be available
on broadly the same terms as at present, but with important modifications intended 
to reduce the burden on public finances.
The optimal solution in terms of student finance would be to continue to have 
a government-backed loan scheme to support graduate contributions up to a regulated
maximum. However, we recognise that the very poor condition of the public finances
over the next decade may make it difficult to reconcile the need for investment to
sustain a world-class university system with a fully state-supported model. As a result,
we believe that the alternative models for leveraging private finance into the sector
which currently exist should be explored in more detail. This should include carrying
out an impact assessment of these models on particular groups of students,
institutions, and on national policy goals (such as increasing social mobility). We
indicate some options which we believe are worthy of further analysis, but do not
support any one particular proposal in this area in its current form.
Maintenance loans for full-time students should be offered on the same terms as loans
for fees, but any changes to the current level of loans or grants for maintenance costs
should be delayed until the effects of changes to the loan system are better understood.
The current requirement placed on universities to provide bursaries at a minimum level
should be replaced with a system whereby universities are free to develop their own
financial aid policies, within the context of an overall strategy to widen participation. 
The student support arrangements in Northern Ireland and Wales are currently broadly
similar to those in England. We believe it is important for this parity to be maintained.
Supporting part-time undergraduate students
The student funding system should move towards one which is indifferent in terms 
of the incentives to study full-time or part-time at undergraduate level. 
As a first step towards this, some or all of the financial support available to full-time
undergraduate students should be extended to that cohort of part-time undergraduate
students which will benefit the most – based on criteria such as intensity of study,
qualification aim, and highest qualification on entry. We would not wish to see 
any expansion of the student finance system funded through a reduction in the level 
of loans and grants available to full-time students, but believe that the reforms 
to student finance we propose would facilitate the ability of government to devise 
an affordable solution for the expansion of loans to other groups of students.
A group of sector experts should be convened as a matter of urgency to identify this
cohort of students, and to develop the models which will deliver this policy outcome.
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Supporting taught postgraduate students
Strong consideration should be given to extending the support available to taught
postgraduate students, both full-time and part-time. This is especially so in light 
of the economic importance of this group of students, and also to address issues 
of fair access.
As part of this, the national evidence base regarding the financing of taught
postgraduate education needs to be improved, and the dynamics of supply and 
demand in this market better understood.
HEFCE funding
The review of the HEFCE teaching funding method which is currently underway 
should continue to be the primary vehicle through which proposals on the distribution
of public funding for teaching are consulted on and developed. We will deal with 
this area in more detail through that means. Thus, the recommendations we make
regarding public funding in this submission are at a higher level of generality than 
other areas.
There will remain a strong role for public funding of the higher education system 
in future. The positive features of the methods used by HEFCE to distribute this funding
currently should be retained in future. Consideration will need to be given to the ways 
in which the graduate contribution system as described in our proposals would interact
with the public funding system.
Some of the proposals currently under discussion in the sector regarding the 
graduate contribution may lead in the long term to greater variability in the pricing of
undergraduate education for home and EU students. In such circumstances, in order 
to secure the desired outcomes relating to quality, participation and sustainability,
these proposals might need to be accompanied by mechanisms to move student
numbers (and associated HEFCE funding) more fluidly within the system.
Careful analysis should be carried out of the potential effects of any changes to the
HEFCE teaching funding method on all publicly-funded students, including part-time
and taught postgraduate students, and on institutions with high proportions of such
students.
Options should be explored for increasing universities’ responsiveness to changes 
in the pattern of student demand over time.
Managing overall student numbers
The total number of the country’s students in higher education should reflect the
Robbins Principle, that ‘courses of higher education should be available to all those
who are qualified by ability and attainment to pursue them, and who wish to do so’.
It is in the collective interest of universities, the government, and of society more
broadly that there is some management of the overall call on public resources 
in relation to higher education, and thus that the overall number of students in the
publicly-funded system should continue to be controlled for the time being. The
management of overall numbers of publicly-funded students should be built on 
a sustainable system of student finance.
Any efficiencies introduced into the system as a result of increasing student numbers
need to be sustainable over time, and should not impact on the overall quality of the
student experience.
5
6In conclusion
6 The need for reform of the higher education funding system is urgent, and the price 
of failure would be high. This would be true under any circumstances, but the case for
change is especially strong at the current time, given the centrality of universities to 
the UK’s economic recovery. The future success of the university system is by no means
secure, but we are confident that through the proposals contained in this submission,
and with detailed consideration of the options in other areas which we highlight as 
part of a rolling programme of reform, universities will be able to deliver a high-quality,
world-leading service from which students, graduates, the government, and taxpayers
would continue to benefit, now and into the future.
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The overview and purpose of Universities UK’s submission to the Browne Review
Our objectives in making proposals and setting out discussion of key issues
The principles we have used to guide the development of these proposals, and 
which we will use to assess the recommendations made by the Review in due course
1 Overview
1 This submission sets out the response of Universities UK to the call for proposals 
made by the Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and Student 
Finance (hereafter ‘the Review’). Within this document, we make a series 
of recommendations which, taken together, describe a future funding system 
for teaching in higher education which will benefit students, universities, the
government, and wider society. 
2 In some of the areas we consider, the evidence is clear-cut, and firm policy 
proposals are made as a result. However, in other areas, our analysis has led to the
conclusion that the evidence is less strong. In such cases, we set out a discussion of the 
key issues, and indicate the possible consequences of making certain policy choices 
over others. We also emphasise, where relevant, the need for further analysis and
evidence gathering to be carried out before informed policy positions can be adopted.
3 We have developed a number of objectives which we have used to guide our thinking 
in preparing this submission. These are set out later in this section. We recognise that
there are a number of ways in which these objectives could be achieved. As a result, 
we have also developed a set of principles which have been used in the preparation of
the discussion in this document, and which we will also use in assessing the
recommendations made by the Review in due course.
4 In this submission we describe a rolling programme of reform which will need to 
be carefully analysed and implemented over a suitable timescale – we think a minimum
of 5–7 years, and possibly longer. We are mindful of the urgent need for change in 
some areas now, but also of the potential negative consequences of attempting to
introduce too many perturbations into the system at once, and the destabilising effect
this may have on participation, and on institutions (and by extension on the ability to
meet student demand).
5 The 2004 reforms introduced a profound change into higher education in the UK. 
For the first time, the principle was established that graduates, not students, 
should contribute to the costs of their higher education. At the same time, student
expectations have rightfully increased, and the relationship between the student 
and his/her university has changed irrevocably and for the better. We believe it is right 
that universities should continue to focus on providing the best possible experience 
for their students, which in the UK is at least comparable to the very best available
anywhere in the world. The 2004 reforms also recognised that maintaining this 
level of excellence requires investment. While the income from fees capped at £3,0002
has made a very important contribution to stabilising the sector’s finances, evidence 
set out in our first submission suggests that they do not go far enough towards
ensuring that UK higher education is sustainable in the long term, to meet the 
rising expectations of students, and to ensure that we can continue to compete
internationally on the basis of high quality.
This section 
sets out:
Section 1
Introduction 
7
2
Rising anually with inflation.
86 We argue strongly that reducing investment in higher education is economically 
self-defeating – we need strong universities more than ever to drive growth and provide
the kind of skilled workforce we will need to thrive as a nation in the future. However,
we are also aware that repairing the national finances may take a decade or more. 
We therefore need a new compact on funding teaching in higher education which
involves universities, the government, and graduates. Our proposals suggest how 
such a compact could be established on a sustainable basis for the future.
7 The system for funding higher education in the UK is complex and interconnected.
Policy changes in one area inevitably have an impact on other areas. In our 
submission, we set out what the potential impact of our proposals may be on the 
whole system, and the issues which policymakers will need to take into account 
as a result. We also believe that the fundamental aspects of the current system are
strong (while recognising where reform is most urgent). Thus, what we present is 
an evolution of aspects of the current system, which we believe is founded on sound
principles. We do not see a case for dismantling what we have already and replacing 
it in large measure with something new.
8 Overall, our aim is to develop a system which will benefit students and the economy
first and foremost. This is the principal mission of the UK’s universities with regard 
to the education they deliver, and the current and future needs of students and society
remain at the forefront of our thinking. We are also concerned to ensure that the
current high quality of university education in the UK can be maintained in the 
future, and the impact of any reforms to student funding on quality is a key theme 
in our submission. Finally, we want to see participation increase – not just in terms 
of numbers of students, but also in terms of continuing to ensure that students 
who are qualified to do so can participate in higher education, regardless of their 
socio-economic group, age, race, gender, or any other factor.
9 This submission is structured as follows:
a This section sets out the overall vision, objectives, and principles underpinning our
proposals and policy discussion. 
b The second section contains a detailed analysis of the issues, and sets out the 
evidence which has led to the formulation of our proposals. Where the evidence 
is inconclusive we have said so, and have indicated where further work will be required.
The analysis is structured around the key components of the student funding system:
the graduate contribution framework, including student loans and grants; HEFCE and
the use of public funding; and managing student numbers.
c The final section addresses the four questions set out in the call for proposals,
summarising material which is presented throughout the submission.
2 Objectives
10 The objectives of Universities UK in making the proposals and setting out the
discussion contained in this submission are as follows. These are grouped into five 
main areas: general objectives of the system as a whole; objectives for students;
objectives for graduates; objectives for government; and objectives for universities.
General
Ensure that the UK has a sustainable student funding system now and in the future,
addressing the sustainability gaps which exist in the current system.
Develop a system which can provide for the efficient use of public and private resources.
Ensure that the UK can maintain its world-class status in the provision of 
higher education.
Ensure that the services universities provide can successfully meet the needs of the 
UK economy, now and in the future.
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Ensure that all students, regardless of their background, have access to 
better-resourced higher education; and that protection remains in place in the 
publicly-funded system for graduates with low lifetime earnings.
Students
Increase investment in the learning environment and in the student experience over 
the long term.
Continue to provide a guaranteed package of government-backed support to help 
meet the present and future costs of higher education, including living costs.
Increase choice in terms of when and how to meet the contribution to the costs 
of higher education, while maintaining the principle that there is no obligation on
students to meet the upfront costs of their higher education.
Increase the resources devoted to frontline teaching and learning.
Improve the provision of information on courses and the HE offer to allow for
appropriate comparisons and more informed choices to be made.
Enhance student engagement in quality assurance.
Ensure that universities are able to remain responsive to student demands.
Graduates
Continue to retain the progressive features of the current student loan system, 
and increase these where possible.
Continue to provide insurance through the loan system for graduates early in their
careers, and for those with low lifetime earnings.
Government
Reduce the resource cost of loans (the ‘RAB charge’).
Develop the potential to increase the size of the overall loan book while reducing the
risk associated with this in terms of public accounting rules.
Develop means of spreading the risks involved in providing student loans.
Maintain the capacity to stimulate demand for provision in key strategic areas 
as required.
Retain the ability to regulate the system – through setting a maximum level for 
the graduate contribution.
Introduce greater efficiency in the way the system as a whole is accountable 
and regulated.
Universities
Increase investment through an increase in the graduate contribution, and build 
on existing efforts to facilitate investment through other means, such as employer
contributions and private finance.
Retain and enhance institutional autonomy, whilst recognising the broader public
interest in maintaining a high quality system.
Strengthen the quality assurance system, to make it more robust and outward-facing.
Continue to ensure that provision can evolve dynamically in response to student
demand.
Develop means of embedding widening access initiatives and financial aid as part 
of an institution-specific recruitment strategy.
9
10
3 Principles
11 Universities UK has formulated a number of principles which it believes should guide
the Independent Review team in the development of its recommendations. There 
is a range of ways in which the objectives set out above could be achieved, but some
options could potentially introduce negative or unintended consequences which
Universities UK believes would be unacceptable. These principles will also be used 
as criteria against which the recommendations of the Review will be assessed.
12 The principles are as follows:
There needs to be increased revenue into the higher education sector, to maintain
quality, enhance the student experience, and to ensure international competitiveness.
The sector should be funded on a sustainable basis.
Any increase in the maximum graduate contribution should be accompanied by an
increase in the loan available to meet the cost of that contribution.
Participation needs to be increased.
Any changes introduced into the system should help promote social mobility – there
must be no barriers to entry to higher education based on household income (although
we recognise that the student finance system plays only a small part in improving this).
The maintenance grant system should be targeted to those students who have the
greatest financial need.
The student support system should work towards being indifferent as to the incentives
to pursue full-time or part-time study.
The impact of any reforms on institutional viability should be analysed and taken 
into account.
Clear and transparent information needs to be made available to prospective students,
in order to allow them to make informed choices.
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13 The Independent Review of Higher Education Funding and Student Finance was
established as a condition of the 2004 reforms, to monitor the impact of the introduction
of variable fees and associated legislation at that time, and to ensure that there was 
no adverse effect on important national policy aims. The financial and political context
against which those reforms took place is now very different. We deal here with some 
of the most salient features of that context, the way it has changed, and the influence
this has on the way our proposals are formulated. We do not attempt to provide a
comprehensive analysis of the whole context, but rather, we focus on those elements
which are most relevant in terms of their impact on higher education.
14 We also draw here on some of the material which was set out in our first submission 
to the Review, which looked retrospectively at the impact of the introduction of 
variable fees.
I Impact of the 2004 reforms
15 The Universities UK response to the Review’s call for evidence demonstrated clearly 
the positive nature of the reforms to student funding which were introduced with 
the legislation in 2004. The additional revenue brought into the sector has been used 
to enhance the student experience, while our universities now serve a larger and 
more diverse student population than ever3. Over the period since the introduction 
of the reforms, participation increased, including participation by students in the lowest
socio-economic groups. The main fears associated with the introduction of the £3,000
fee have not been realised.
16 However, these gains relate only to full-time students. Whilst we note that in terms 
of full-time equivalent (FTE), full-time study accounts for 62% of full-time students 
who are under 21on entry, and aiming for a first degree,4 we are concerned about the
quality of the student experience across the sector. As we noted in our first submission,
part-time student support is currently inadequate, and this is something we address
further below.5
Section 2
Proposals and discussion of policy options
11
1 Background and context
3
See Making it count: how
universities are using income
from variable fees, Universities
UK, January 2010.
4
HEFCE analysis of HESA data,
contained in HEFCE March
2010/10.
5
See Universities UK’s first
submission to the Review 
for more details, (available at
www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/
PolicyAndResearch/
PolicyAreas/Documents/
Independent%20Review%
20of%20Funding%20and%
20Student%20Finance%
20First%20call%
20submission.pdf).
Our analysis of the impact of the reforms introduced in 2004
Changes which have taken place in the fiscal environment, which will impact
particularly on the formulation of our proposals
Analysis of future economic needs
Analysis of the current and future demand for higher education
A description of the regulatory framework for higher education, and the complex,
interconnected nature of the system
Why we believe that a rolling programme of reform is necessary
Part 1 of this 
section sets out:
12
Figure 1 
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17 Moreover, the gains described above have been achieved at considerable cost to the
government. Analysis by the Institute for Fiscal Studies shows that universities gained 
a net £1.3bn additional fee income since the introduction of the new system, students
gained £1.1bn in financial support through the provision of grants and the abolition of
upfront fees, but that taxpayers contributed £1.1bn more to the system through grants
and loan subsidies, and this figure increased again in 2007–08 with the introduction 
of more generous maintenance grants.6 The breakdown of taxpayer costs of student
support is illustrated in Figure 1opposite. 
18 As we noted in our first submission, the UK spends proportionately more of its total
investment in higher education on student support – 26% compared to an OECD
average of 19%. This is likely to increase with the variable fee regime in steady state. 
The student funding system in its current form is unsustainable, especially against 
a backdrop of increasing student demand, and a national economic imperative to
increase the skill base of the UK workforce. 
19 In our first submission, we also noted the contribution that the additional income 
from variable fees has made to improvements in the financial health and long-term
sustainability of the sector, which had been previously eroded by a long period 
of under-funded expansion. There are, however, already signs of the recession’s 
impact on institutions’ finances – for example, the reduction in the sector’s surplus 
as a proportion of total income.7
II The current fiscal environment
20 While the need for investment in universities remains the same, the fiscal environment
in which they are operating is very different now compared with six years ago. With 
a deficit in public finance of £163bn for this year, and substantial deficits predicted 
for years to come, cuts in funding for public services appear inevitable. The higher
education sector, although strictly speaking not part of the public sector, has already
borne a share of cuts, and we remain deeply concerned about the implications 
of further significant reductions in public funding. The effects of the new coalition
government’s spending plans on the higher education budget remain to be seen,
although we note that analysis of Conservative party plans by the Institute for Fiscal
Studies in April 20108 suggested these plans could lead to a cumulative cut of 25.1% in
non-protected departmental expenditure limits (DELs) by 2014–15 relative to Labour’s
planned DELs for 2010–11, with cuts of £6bn planned for this year (see Table 1above).9
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6
The interest charged on
student loans currently 
is linked to inflation – it is
based on the annual Retail
Price Index (RPI) in March 
or the highest base rate 
of a number of major banks
plus 1%; whichever is lower.
7
TRAC, the Transparent
Approach to Costing, 
is the standard activity-based
costing system used in all 
UK HEIs and provides the 
most consistent cost data
available across UK higher
education. TRAC cost
adjustments are government-
approved adjustments to 
the expenditure in published
university financial
statements, which are
intended to make the costs 
in TRAC consistent across
institutions which use
different accounting policies
for assets, and to include 
an adjustment for the cost 
of risk and financing. They
therefore address the fact 
that historic expenditure may
understate the true costs 
of past activity.
8
Filling the hole: How do the
three main UK parties plan 
to repair the public finances?
(available at www.ifs.org.uk/
publications/4848).
9
The £6bn efficiency 
savings in 2010–11have been
confirmed as part of the
coalition government deal.
Table 1 
Implications of Conservative
stated policies for DEL,
relative to Labour’s 
planned DEL for 2010–11 
(£bn, 2010–11 prices), 
April 2010
Note: Average annual 
growth rates are calculated
over four years, relative 
to Labour’s planned DEL
spending in 2010–11. 
Cumulative changes are 
also expressed relative to
Labour’s planned 2010–11
DEL spending. 
Source: Institute 
for Fiscal Studies
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Average annual
change (%) 
–4.0%
9.1%
0.1%
–6.3%
–7.0%
£ billion
2014–15 
–59.4
3.8
0.5
–9.4
–54.3
£ billion
2013–14 
–50.1
3.4
0.4
–7.8
–46.1
£ billion
2012–13 
–34.2
2.2
0.3
–5
–31.6
£ billion
2011–12 
–21.1
1
0.1
–2.7
–19.6
£ billion
2010–11 
–6
0
0
0
–6
Total DEL
Overseas Aid 
NHS 
Ministry of Defence
All other DELs
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III Future economic needs 
21 Universities serve the needs of students, the economy, and wider society. They are 
net contributors to the economy, deliver the skills and knowledge needed for future
economic success, and also generate substantial public benefits. In all of these
spheres, requirements and expectations are changing rapidly. The proportion of jobs
requiring skills at Level 4 or above is expected to increase by 11percentage points
between now and 2020.10 Universities will meet these skills needs through provision 
at different levels – both undergraduate and postgraduate – and through different
modes and types of study (full-time, part-time, distance learning etc).
22 The trend towards increased participation in higher education in recent years 
suggests an increase of 11.7 percentage points in the proportion of the UK’s working 
age population with higher education qualifications between 2007 and 2020 (see Table 2
above). However, the profile of the working-age population in other countries is also
projected to change. Thus whilst 43.5% of this population in the UK is expected to have 
a higher education qualification by 2020, this still places the UK only 10th in the OECD
rankings in this respect (behind, for example, Denmark with 51.6%). A further increase
in the rate of participation is likely to be required in order for the UK to remain globally
competitive in the knowledge economy.
23 The UK Commission for Employment and Skills (UKCES) Skills Audit states that 
‘actual expansion in the number of jobs is most likely in the higher skilled occupations
of managers, professionals and associate professional/technical occupations. Indeed
growth in these three groups over the next ten years is likely to be equivalent to the
whole net increase in employment for the economy as a whole. These groups account
for 43% of jobs today, and may well account for 47% by 2017 – a growth of nearly 
2.2 million jobs’ (illustrated in Figure 3 opposite).11
24 Increasing the supply of graduates into the economy is not only a means of meeting
existing and future demand, but also has the potential to further stimulate economic
growth. UKCES has echoed the Leitch Review in pointing to the importance not 
only of meeting projected expansion and replacement demand, but of the UK securing 
a continuing edge in the pursuit of competitive advantage in the face of increasing
international competition. As the Skills Audit points out, ‘there is likely to be 
a continuing or increasing focus on skills in high wage (and other) economies as 
a source of competitive advantage, as countries/companies seek to move up the 
value chain and into higher quality goods/services’.12
10
From 29% now to 40% in 2020,
according to the Leitch Review
of Skills, Prosperity for all 
in the global economy – world
class skills, December 2006.
11
Skills for Jobs: Today and
Tomorrow – The National
Strategic Skills Audit 
for England 2010, UKCES,
December 2009.
12
Ibid.
Table 2 
Projected proportion 
of the working age
population with higher
education qualifications
Source: 2020 projected
figure from Ambition 2020:
World-class skills and jobs
for the UK (UKCES 2009),
2007 figure from 
Education at a glance 
2009 (OECD 2009).
Change 
(percentage point)   
+11.9 
+18.9 
+17.2 
+19.4 
+7.7 
+16.9 
+11.6 
+12.0 
+15.2 
+11.7 
2020
(UKCES data)
60.2%
59.9%
51.8%
51.6%
48.0%
46.7%
45.8%
45.7%
44.2%
43.5%
2007
(OECD data)
48.3%
41.0%
34.6%
32.2%
40.3%
29.8%
34.2%
33.7%
29.0%
31.8%
Country
Canada
Japan
Korea
Denmark
United States
Iceland
Norway
Australia
Spain
United Kingdom
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25 UKCES argues that demand for high level skills matters as well as supply. The Skills
Audit points out that the UK’s growth in skills demand is one of the lowest in the OECD,
and argues that action needs to be taken both to ensure that skills and qualifications
match employer need, but also to encourage employers to make better use of available
skills by ‘moving up the value chain, into higher value added products and services:
using a more knowledge-intensive work organisation and hence better means to
effectively deploy their more highly skilled and qualified workers’.13
26 There is evidence that graduates, and the intellectual capital they bring, can have 
a transformative effect on the culture of a business, increasing productivity and
innovation. For example, studies of the use made by employers of graduate level skills
suggested that graduates were seen as bringing new ideas, enthusiasm and a fresh
perspective to organisations.14 One study has suggested that graduates contribute 
in the region of three times their own salaries in terms of value to business, bringing
with them the ability to innovate, and generate solutions to problems; to cope with the
changes this brings about; and to develop faster than other employees and add value 
to an organisation more quickly. They also demonstrate leadership qualities faster 
than other employees and have the skills to articulate ideas into the ‘cut and thrust 
of working life’ research. The pattern of graduate recruitment during the recession 
also points to evidence of an appetite and clear business case for these benefits, even
during an economic downturn.15
27 As the Leitch report made clear, in order to support the aim of a more highly skilled
workforce by 2020, it will be important to provide opportunities for those already in
work – more than 70% of the UK working age population is already over the age of 16.16
Prospective students in the workforce are more likely to want to study part-time or have
an interest in ‘compressed’ degrees. Looking forward, career patterns are changing –
with employees less likely to stay in the same roles throughout their careers. This 
may mean opportunities for re-skilling, including opportunities for accessing higher
education, will become more important in the future. This will be particularly true 
for individuals whose education may have prepared them adequately for the labour
market which previously existed, but who are less well-prepared for a labour market 
in which lower-skilled job opportunities are contracting as the occupational structure
in the UK changes. Providing opportunities for people to acquire higher-level skills 
by participating in higher education later in life therefore has two dimensions – meeting
economic needs and a social justice element. This points towards an increased need 
to reform funding provision for part-time undergraduate students.
15
13
Ibid.
14
T Hogarth et al, Employer 
and University Engagement 
in the Use and Development 
of Graduate Level Skills,
University of Warwick 
Institute for Employment
Research, 2007.
15
A Hesketh, Adding Value
Beyond Measure, Association 
of Graduate Recruiters, 2004.
See also: Small Business
Solutions: Graduate
employment scheme
(available at www.fsb.org.uk/
policy/assets/graduate
%20employment%20scheme.
pdf), which suggested that
25% of small businesses
believed graduate internships
would help them increase
staffing during the recession.
16
Prosperity for all in the global
economy – world class skills.
Figure 3 
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IV Current and future demand
28 Demand from UK and EU students for full-time undergraduate courses in the UK 
is very high, and has risen significantly over the last few years (see Figure 4 above). 
But in recent years the imbalance of supply and demand has been especially severe,
and thousands of qualified applicants have been unable to secure a place.17 The
additional constraints on student recruitment introduced for 2009 entry were explicitly
linked to pressures on the government’s student support budget.
29 With regard to future demand for full-time study, it should be noted that the majority 
of UK domiciled, full-time first degree entrants are young (78% are aged under 21years
of age). As we noted in our first submission to the Review, prior educational attainment 
is the primary determinant of young participation in higher education, irrespective 
of socio-economic background. The vast majority of students with two or more A levels
go on to further study, and the overwhelming majority of such students currently 
study full time.18 The proportion of the 17-year-old population in England achieving this 
level of qualification has increased over the last ten years (see Figure 5 opposite), and
this trend is likely to continue with the raising of the compulsory leaving age to 18. These
trends in prior attainment, combined with the projected rise in the young population
from the higher social classes noted in submissions to the first call for evidence
suggest a continuing strong demand for full-time study – at least from English students
(see Figures 5 and 6 opposite).19
16
17
Figures from UCAS show 
that 139,520 applicants for
entry in 2009 were non-placed
(that is 55 days after release 
of A level results had no 
offers, did not meet conditions
of an offer or applied too late).
This represents 22.4% of
applicants for entry in 2009, 
an increase in the proportion
of applicants without a place 
in 2008. UCAS is currently
undertaking further analysis
using information on prior
attainment to determine 
the extent of unmet qualified
demand, and the increase 
in this over recent years.
18
H Chowdry, C Crawford, 
L Dearden, A Goodman, 
A Vignoles, Widening
Participation in Higher
Education: analysis using linked
administrative data, Institute
for Fiscal Studies, June 2008.
19
These figures relate to the
English population only. There
are no comparable data for EU
students from outside the UK.
Thus although eight of the 
ten EU countries from which
the most UK students are
drawn are projected to show
decreases in their 18 year old
populations by 2027, it is not
clear how this might translate
into full-time demand. 
Figure 4 
Increase in full-time
undergraduate 
applicants to 
UK higher education
institutions by 
region of domicile, 
2004–10
pUnited Kingdom
pOther EU
Source: UCAS data
Applicants
2004 2005 2006 2007 2008 2009 2010
550,000
500,000
450,000
400,000
350,000
300,000
250,000
200,000
150,000
100,000
50,000
0
Universities UK Submission to the Independent Review of HE Funding and Student Finance 17
Figure 5 
Proportion of 
17-year-old population
achieving two or more
GCE/VCE/Applied 
A levels or equivalent,
1994–2007
Source: Department for
Children, Schools and
Families, SFR 02/2008
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30 Part-time undergraduate demand is much more difficult to quantify because 
there is no shared admissions service. This means there is little reliable data on 
UK-wide (or England-wide) trends in part-time applicants. It is true that part-time
undergraduate enrolments in English HEIs have increased by only 2.3% over the 
last five years (between 2004–05 and 2008–09), but enrolments are only indicative
of the level of demand – they also reflect patterns of supply. Forthcoming research
commissioned by Universities UK will explore some of the factors influencing 
patterns of part-time participation. The research shows that reported institutional
experience of levels of part-time demand varies. Some institutions have perceived
significant unmet demand and have developed provision accordingly; others are 
aware of little demand.20
31 The ‘push’ factors stimulating part-time demand will differ from those stimulating 
full-time demand, with shifting employment patterns and specific perceived skills
requirements likely to be more significant. It is possible that policy changes being
introduced now (for example, any increase in the number of apprenticeships available),
will help stimulate an increase in desire for part-time study in the future among 
groups of students who have traditionally chosen full-time study.
V The regulatory and accountability framework for higher education
32 The regulatory and accountability framework which supports the teaching and learning
experience of publicly-funded students in the English higher education system21 should
reflect the status of this system as both a public good and a source of private benefit.
With this in mind, it should result in a series of desired outcomes:
a Participation by those who are qualified by potential, ability and attainment, and
especially in ways that promote social mobility and economic growth.
b High quality of student experience and outcomes, so that our universities remain
national assets.
c Sustainable provision that makes efficient use of both public and private resources.
33 These outcomes sit at the apex of a regulatory and accountability ecosystem which
comprises three key elements – price, volume, and information; and three main 
agents – government, universities, and students (or prospective students). All these
components need to be finely balanced to achieve the desired outcomes. Policymakers
collectively will, therefore, need to consider how best to manage the various elements
of this system in future to protect the outcomes. It is these outcomes, and not the
‘balance of power’ between the agents per se, that are our chief concern. There will 
be a number of pressures on the system in future, including, potentially, an increase 
in the role that private and for-profit providers have to play in the wider reputation 
of UK higher education.22 Consideration of the regulatory framework as it applies to
private providers of higher education in the UK will have to be a major factor in debates
about the evolving role of HEFCE and other bodies.
34 We stress that there remains a strong public interest element in universities,
regardless of the way in which they are funded, and there will need to be some form 
of appropriate regulation and accountability to assure this. This is a question that 
goes beyond providing a guarantee of appropriate financial support to students, 
to a broader balancing or smoothing of market effects in the interests of these 
students – for example, it will incorporate the assurance of quality and the provision 
of information to students. There is also a public interest in the overall financial
sustainability of the system. 
20
C Callender, G Mason, 
A Jamieson, The supply 
of part-time provision in 
higher education in the UK
[Working title], Universities
UK, forthcoming.
21
That is, home and EU
undergraduate and taught
postgraduate students.
22
Cf The growth of private and
for-profit higher education
providers in the UK,
Universities UK, March 2010.
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35 The actions of the agents in this regulatory and accountability framework are
influenced by a range of external factors. These include, for example, levels of demand;
levels of prior attainment; the extent of risk aversion; and assessed national skills
needs. For example, where there is a high level of qualified demand relative to 
volume of places, the influence of student demand will be more limited. As a result,
government may seek to influence the maximum institutional teaching resource 
in this system (public funding and graduate/student contribution combined) to ensure
the decisions of individual institutions do not undermine the intended outcomes.
Conversely, were the volume of places to significantly outstrip supply, government
might seek to influence the lower end of this resource, to ensure quality across 
the system is maintained. A further complicating factor is that the nature of the
external factors may be contested (for example, in relation to the future skills needs
that are of greatest public benefit); or the evidence may not be clear (for example, 
the extent of risk aversion among potential students).
36 There are a number of safeguards in place within the current system to protect the
student experience. HEFCE has a statutory duty to ensure that provision is made 
for assessing the quality of education provided in the institutions that it funds. This 
duty is discharged through the Quality Assurance Agency (QAA), which safeguards
quality and standards in UK HE, checking how well universities and colleges meet 
their responsibilities. Universities UK is committed to a quality assurance (QA) system 
which is accountable, rigorous, transparent, flexible, responsive and public facing.
37 Following extensive consultation, including with student unions, we are working 
with HEFCE, GuildHE and QAA to implement a number of improvements to the 
QA system. These include ways to make institutional audit more flexible and
responsive. We support student auditors on audit teams, fully contributing to audit
judgements.23 We also support the work of the Office of the Independent Adjudicator
(OIA), as a rigorous and independent adjudicator for student complaints. The OIA 
is funded by institutional subscriptions and free at the point of use for students. 
38 Finally, we note that there are specific regulatory constraints relating to particular
subjects, with more than fifty professional, statutory and regulatory bodies operating 
in higher education.
VI A rolling programme of reform
39 Since we propose evolution of the system rather than a radical overhaul, there 
should be a rolling programme of reform of the student funding system in England,
carried out over an appropriate timescale (of at least 5–7 years). This should allow 
for reforms to be introduced in the short term where both the evidence and the need 
are demonstrably greatest, while providing for the gathering of further evidence and
conducting of additional analyses where the impact of policy options is more uncertain.
40 The changes we propose represent an evolution of the current system, which we 
believe is fundamentally strong in principle. We do not see a need for wholesale reform,
or for scrapping large parts of the system and starting again.
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I Introduction
41 The 2004 reforms established the principle that full-time home and EU undergraduate
students would contribute as graduates towards the cost of their studies. However,
these reforms have only gone part of the way to setting the higher education system 
on a path to sustainable funding for the future, and more needs to be done to ensure
this system remains fit for purpose and delivers high quality outcomes for all its
students – part-time, as well as full-time; undergraduates as well as postgraduates. 
42 We set out here a number of ways that the current system of full-time student support
might be modified – with respect to the terminology used to describe the system, 
the level of the contribution; and the terms of loans, all of which we believe need to 
be urgently addressed. We also discuss how maintenance support for these students
might evolve. We then discuss the practical steps that we think should be taken now 
in line with our principle that the student finance system should move towards being
indifferent as to the incentives to undertake full-time or part-time undergraduate
study, and the desirability of extending support to taught postgraduate students.
II The principle of a graduate contribution
43 We support an evolution of the current system for full-time home and EU students,
which is designed to ensure that students do not have to pay upfront, but that 
graduates contribute towards a proportion of their education through income
contingent loans for fees.
44 This system is better suited to a diverse sector of autonomous institutions than 
a graduate tax or a mandatory fixed-length graduate contribution scheme. It preserves
a choice for students and their families in decisions about how to contribute towards
the cost of their higher education and allows a more significant role for student choice
in driving funding for institutions. It also helps to ensure the maintenance of high
quality provision in a more tightly constrained public funding environment, by delivering
a secure, clearly hypothecated income stream. Any mandatory graduate contribution
scheme would, in contrast, be more than likely to either require public funding to 
be maintained at current levels (with all funding currently used to support the student
loan scheme being redirected to universities), or to require an increase in public
expenditure, simply to preserve the current unit of funding.24
24
By unit of funding we mean 
the publicly planned unit 
of funding comprising HEFCE
grant and public fee and
private regulated fee.
2 The graduate contribution framework
Our recommendation that the language of tuition fees and loans be replaced with 
the language of a graduate contribution
Our recommendation that this contribution be allowed to increase over time, 
up to a regulated maximum
Our proposals for the changes we think are urgently required to the system 
of full-time student support
Analysis of models that have been suggested to fund a graduate contribution 
above the maximum supported by a government loan
A discussion of how maintenance support, including bursaries, should develop 
Our proposals for practical steps to expand this system to part-time 
undergraduate students
Our proposals for supporting taught postgraduate students
Part 2 of this 
section sets out:
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45 We would also support a system which continued to make government loans for 
tuition contributions available to all students, regardless of household income. 
This structure is preferable to restricting such loans to particular groups of students
based on household income, which undermines the message that participation 
in higher education is about the graduate’s ability to pay, rather than the student’s 
or their family’s ability to pay.25
46 However, whilst the 2004 reforms established for the first time the principle that 
the graduate should contribute towards a proportion of the cost of their education, 
this principle is not widely understood by prospective students and the wider public. 
The perception that ‘fees’ represent a mandatory private contribution by students 
(or their families) makes it difficult to make the case for the progressive nature 
of a private graduate contribution towards teaching costs. Despite three years of 
a heavily-subsidised loan scheme, therefore, the ‘adaptability’ challenge remains
substantial, and it is essential that the Review considers how the case for private
contributions can be more effectively communicated and internalised by potential
students and the wider public, through developing a clearer narrative. 
47 Because of this, we would strongly support a change in the way the fee for 
full-time home and EU students is described and communicated to students.
Specifically, the Review should give strong consideration to describing this as 
a ‘graduate contribution’. At the very least, a more coordinated campaign involving 
both government and universities should ensure that the following messages 
and features are clearly communicated:
a The contribution represents a future investment on the part of the student.
b There is mutual investment between the student and their institution: the ‘tuition fee’
paid by the student covers only part of the cost of teaching and investment in the
student’s learning environment.
c Repayments are made on an income contingent basis – essentially a payroll deduction.
d Because of this, any change in the interest rate on loans to support this contribution
alters the length of the loan rather than the monthly repayments.
e The option to pay upfront remains. 
48 Such messages may be particularly important for students from non-traditional
backgrounds and those who are particularly risk averse, and the language could be
further refined through consultation with such groups. Wider use of illustrative case
studies may be a useful means of getting these messages across.26
III The level of the graduate contribution
49 Our concern is to help protect investment in a high quality student experience across
the sector. We propose that the unit of funding for teaching prior to the implementation
of recent cuts should be restored as soon as possible and at the very least maintained 
in the immediate future.27 Given the fiscal outlook over the medium term, and the 
level of student demand, it is likely that this will have to be secured through a higher
graduate contribution. Over the longer term, we can envisage a position in which this
upper limit would be appreciably higher than its current level, but we propose that it
should remain regulated. 
50 Over time, the maximum graduate contribution should be set at a level which, 
in combination with other income sources, allows universities to recover the costs 
of their teaching provision, and develop appropriate pricing and financial strategies.
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We also note that the
administrative structures
associated with means-testing
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In our first submission 
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planned unit of funding 
for teaching (HEFCE grant 
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£7,500 in 2009–10 before
unfunded student numbers
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51 Our rationale for this position is that sustaining quality is essential, and that further
investment is therefore needed. We should aspire to ensure our overall spending 
per student allows us to maintain a world-class university system.28 As we outlined 
in our first submission, simply protecting the overall level of funding secured following
the introduction of variable fees will not, over the long term, be sufficient to ensure the
sector continues to deliver high quality provision; meets rising student expectations;
and adapts to the needs of an increasingly diverse student population. 
52 We recognise that any increase in graduate contributions would strengthen the 
positive trend of rising student expectations and engagement, and we fully support 
this. As we showed in our publication Making it count, universities demonstrably
increased their investment in the quality and sustainability of the student learning
environment and in supporting high quality outcomes for students (for example,
through enhanced careers services) following the introduction of variable fees. Further,
as our joint publication with the CBI, Future fit, demonstrated,29 universities continue 
to develop a range of approaches in conjunction with employers to enhance graduate
employability. We recognise that such employability skills will be of paramount
importance in future.
53 Since these reports were published, we have conducted some initial case studies,
which examine strategic priorities for investment to enhance the student learning
experience and outcomes. These illustrate ways that significant enhancements to the
core student experience could be delivered if universities have the resources to invest
further in this. They also illustrate the resource implications inherent in embedding
innovations and enhancements in the student experience across the curriculum, and
doing so in ways that will benefit students over the long term.30
54 There is a broader public interest in the long-term sustainability of teaching in the
higher education system. The work of ensuring the robustness of data on the full 
costs of teaching (TRAC data) and embedding this in institutions’ strategic planning
continues to be taken forward by the TRAC Development Group.
55 The effects of any increase in the average graduate contribution on students,
graduates, universities and taxpayers, would depend on the reforms introduced to the
student finance system. In order to support the development of our submission, and 
to help provide definitive information for the sector, Universities UK commissioned
analysis from the Institute for Fiscal Studies (IFS) on the impact on students, graduates,
and the Exchequer of changing certain parameters in the current student funding
system. This analysis is publicly available,31 and was further developed through funding
from the Nuffield Foundation.32
56 This IFS modelling (discussed further below), suggests that a £5,000 average tuition 
fee across the sector and a 2.2% real interest rate would result in a small net gain 
for taxpayers and an average increase in graduate contributions (although these do 
not take account of any possible behavioural changes). Students would be unaffected,
as long as the fee could be covered by a loan (see Table 3 above, which illustrates the
flow of payments in terms of £ per year of study).
28
We note that the UK’s annual
expenditure on educational
institutions per student for 
all services relative to GDP 
per capita in 2006 was 28%
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average of 29% (Education 
at a glance 2009, OECD 2009).
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Universities UK, Institute for
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Table 3 
Circular flows of
payments, current 
system and system with
2.2% real interest rate 
and £5,000 average tuition
fee (£ per year of study)
Source: Institute for 
Fiscal Studies
Current
2009–10 system
-7,400
+5,000
-5,400
+7,800
£0
New 2.2% interest rate +
£5,000 fee system   
-7,000
+5,000
-7,600
+9,600
£0
New system compared
with current system   
+400
0
-2,200
+1,800
£0
Taxpayers 
Students 
Graduates 
Universities 
Sum of gains and losses
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57 The flow of payments table above indicates the effects of an increased graduate
contribution (and illustrative reform of the student finance system) on full-time 
home and EU students and graduates. However, a broader evaluation of any change
would be needed – the impact of increasing the graduate contribution on students,
graduates, institutions, and government policy aims should be carefully monitored 
over the long term. There is a need to consider, for example, the effect of changes 
in the graduate contribution for full-time undergraduates on participation by other
groups of publicly-funded students – namely, home and EU part-time undergraduates
and taught postgraduate students, and the resources available to institutions with 
a high proportion of students from either or both of these groups. Equally important 
is the need to monitor the impact on policies to widen participation to university, 
and to increase social mobility.
58 This monitoring should also include consideration of the effects of change on other
groups of students who participate in the English Higher Education system; and on
institutions and students in the devolved administrations.33 This includes the impact 
on student mobility across borders and between countries and the overall coherence 
of the UK Higher Education system. For example, higher contributions in England 
could lead to a change in the proportion of students from the devolved administrations
studying in their own country.34 A maximum home and EU graduate contribution
significantly higher than the current level could also impact on the opportunities 
for non-EU students to study in England.
59 A change in the graduate contribution could also have other less immediately apparent
effects on student mobility that would need to be considered. For example, it could
further impact on the willingness of funding councils to reimburse universities for 
the loss of income from outgoing (UK) Erasmus students,35 and could mean that some
UK HEIs became less willing to accept EU students on Erasmus placements as a result
of seeking to ‘balance the books’ in terms of Erasmus exchange. 
IV Reforms to student finance
a Overview
60 Providing government student loans for fees and maintenance has an impact 
on public finances in three ways. First, there is the net impact of student loans on 
Public Sector Net Debt (PSND, or ‘the national debt’), which is the difference between
total cash loan outgoings in a given year minus total loan repayments in that year.
Second, there is the impact of student loans on the Public Sector Borrowing
Requirement (PSBR) – an ’annual flow’ measure of public debt. This equates to an
estimate of the non-repayment of loans due to any interest subsidy, write-off period
and default (the Resource, Accounting and Budgeting or RAB adjustment). This 
RAB adjustment also appears as non-cash resource spend within departmental
expenditure limits (DELs).
61 Any increase in the size of the loan book would impact on the national debt if this leads
to the cash value of loans issued further exceeding loan repayments in a given year.
However, over the long term, changing the repayment terms could positively impact 
on the national debt either by increasing the rate of repayment or by making the loan
book a more attractive proposition for private finance (thereby removing a part or all 
of the loan book from the public accounts). 
62 The extent to which PSBR and departmental budgets are affected depends on 
the way that the RAB adjustment is made – that is, whether it relates to loans issued 
in a given year or to the total stock of loan debt. In essence, if the RAB adjustment 
is based only on loans issued in a given year (as it is in the DIUS departmental report 
for 2009), it would be possible to increase the size of the loan book without affecting
PSBR as long as the real rate of interest charged reduced the present value of 
non-repayments as a proportion of total lending.36
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complex. As recommended 
in our first submission, 
we would expect the 
Review to maintain ongoing
communications with 
relevant bodies in the 
devolved administrations 
to better understand the
detailed effects of any
recommendations.
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The changes in both England
and Wales in 2006–07 appear
to have had some effect on the
choices of students in Wales –
See the Universities UK
report, Variable tuition fees 
in England, December 2009.
35
The Higher Education Funding
Council for Wales has already
warned that it won’t be able 
to fund a shortfall in fee waiver
reimbursements for outgoing
and incoming Erasmus
students in 2010–11.
36
According to correspondence
with experts in this area, it is
not entirely clear that the RAB
charge is calculated in this 
way across all assessments 
of government spending.
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63 Without clarity on the definition of the RAB adjustment used in all assessments 
of government spending commitments it is difficult to know how much flexibility
government has to increase borrowing without having a detrimental effect. If the 
RAB adjustment relates to the whole stock of unpaid loans then this flexibility 
may be considerably reduced, especially if a real rate of interest is introduced only 
on new loans – since a significant number of the ‘old’ loans, which the government
estimates attract around a subsidy of around 26 pence for every £1 lent, would remain 
in the system for up to 25 years. 
64 In the current economic climate, a significant reduction in the RAB charge on loans 
is imperative to enable the government to support sustainable funding for institutions.
At least a proportion of any savings on the RAB charge should be recycled back into
funding for universities.
65 The three elements of the current student loan repayment system that result 
in the RAB charge are the interest subsidy (outstanding loan balances are indexed 
to inflation); income contingent repayments (currently set at 9% of earnings over
£15,000); and the maximum period of loan liability (current 25 years). Different groups
of graduates benefit from each of these features because of differences in lifetime
earnings profiles. For example, the debt write-off after 25 years benefits many more
female graduates than males.
66 We propose that appropriate marginal income contingent repayments and protection
for low earners should remain a feature of loans to support the graduate contribution 
to tuition and of loans for maintenance support. It is these features that enable us 
to describe this part of the system as a graduate contribution through payroll deduction
rather than a credit card style debt. 
67 We would also support a system which continued to make government loans to 
support graduate contributions available to all students, regardless of household
income. This structure is preferable to restricting such loans to particular groups 
of students based on household income, which undermines the message that
participation in higher education is about the graduate’s ability to pay, rather than 
the student’s or their family’s ability to pay.
68 However, in order to reduce the cost to government of providing loans, some reforms
could be introduced. There are three main options here:
a Introduce a real interest rate. A real rate of interest equivalent to the government 
cost of borrowing would spread the risk between government and the cohort of
borrowers, with the greatest savings coming from medium and high earning graduates.
The risk to the government could be further reduced by raising the interest rate further
to reflect a cohort risk premium (the additional debt not repaid because of write-off 
and other default).
b Increase the repayment rate from 9% of earnings. In comparison with the current
system, the greatest savings would come from graduates with low lifetime earnings.
c Increase the maximum loan liability period from 25 years. In comparison with the
current system, all savings would come from graduates with low lifetime earnings.
69 Under any one or combination of these reforms to government lending, there 
would be no direct risk to institutions themselves, and a variable risk to government
(depending on how much of the cohort risk it was prepared to meet).
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70 We propose that the system should be reformed so that the graduate cohort bears 
the cost of some of the non-repayment in the system, to reduce the influence of this
cost on levels of participation. The system should move closer to a cost neutral scenario
for government, especially given the fiscal pressures likely to be in place over the 
next 5–10 years. However, this will need to be balanced against:
a An assessment of the possible negative effects of reforms to the loan system 
on participation. 
b An assessment of the appropriate length and level of marginal repayments for 
future graduates.
c An assessment of the appropriate level of protection for low earners. 
71 We consider below some of the options for adjusting one or more of the parameters 
in the loan system. We conclude that a rate of interest at least at the government’s cost
of borrowing, but below what we consider to be a commercial rate of interest, should 
be introduced. Consideration should be given to options for combining this with other
adjustments to the repayment rate and length of repayment. These reforms should
apply to both loans to support the graduate contribution and to maintenance loans.
a A real rate of interest
72 According to the modelling undertaken by the IFS for Universities UK,37 if government
loans to support the graduate contribution were to be provided to full-time students 
at an average of £5,000 across the sector, and there were no change in the rate of loan
repayments, a real interest rate of around 4.1% would be required to make the system
‘cost neutral’ (see Figure 7 above) with higher interest rates required to neutralise 
the cost of any subsequent increase in the maximum graduate contribution level. 
For the student, this interest rate would be on top of any index-linked rate of interest
(which is currently variable as it is set to RPI). A risk to government would, of course,
remain since graduate earnings profiles have to be simulated based on historic data
and assumptions about earnings growth.38
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73 If the government were to introduce a real rate of interest equivalent to its cost 
of borrowing (2.2%) it could save £1,200 per student over a three-year course in
comparison with the current system (or £400 per student per year), whilst generating
more income for universities. Graduates with low lifetime earnings (those in the bottom
quartile of the earnings distribution) would receive a higher subsidy in comparison 
with the current system because of the write-off period; others would receive a lower
subsidy (that is, they would repay their loans for longer), as shown in Figure 8 above.39
74 The saving shown in Figure 8 assumes that the rate of repayment remains unaltered.
Graduates could, however, voluntarily increase the rate of repayment in response 
to a higher rate of interest. The effects of this on overall taxpayer costs are difficult to
predict – they could be positive or negative depending on the future earnings profiles 
of those who increase the rate of repayment. The effect on the total RAB charge could
also be affected by any reduction in the take-up of loans following such a reform.
75 One acknowledged issue with the introduction of a real rate of interest is that it raises 
the possibility of an increase in a graduate’s real debt if the graduate’s repayment in 
a given month is less than the real interest charged. The government has the option of
targeting interest subsidies to prevent such a rise in the real debt either across the life of
the loan or, as some have suggested, after an initial period early in a graduate’s career.40
The potential benefits of these targeted interest subsidies should also be considered 
by policymakers – they are a mechanism that avoids penalising career breaks and may
make any reforms easier to sell to the wider public and to prospective students.
b Increasing the repayment rate/maximum loan liability period only
76 The IFS has explored for Universities UK the implications of other changes designed to
save the government more money – an increase in the repayment rate, and an increase
in the loan liability period (both modelled on the current system).
77 Increasing the repayment rate alone would reduce the subsidy for lower earners 
in comparison with the current system, as shown in Figure 9 opposite. An increase 
of five years in the maximum loan liability period (to 30 years) would also mean 
that lower earners paid more, and would only generate a small saving. The effects 
of this are shown in Figure 10 opposite.
39
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Figure 9 
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c Combination of reforms
78 Further modelling by the IFS has shown how the government subsidy of the loan
scheme could be neutralised through a combination of charging a real rate of interest
and altering the repayment rate. As the rate of interest increases, the repayment 
rate required to achieve cost neutrality decreases (with a concomitant increase in 
the subsidy for the lowest earners).
79 We propose, however, that it is essential to avoid a rate of interest that approaches 
a commercial rate, for the following reasons:
a The potential effects on participation, especially as this could obscure the benefits
conferred by a national41 income-contingent loan scheme by making government loans
appear similar to commercial loans. 
b The potential for significant adverse selection – that is, the effects on the take-up 
of loans by those who believe they will have high lifetime earnings. If such assumptions
proved to be correct, the cost to the taxpayer could be increased because the
contribution from those who would be net payers into the system would go down.
c Future opportunity costs in comparison with those for current graduates. The length 
of repayment could be extended significantly compared to the current system.
80 Under a £5,000 average loan, if the government wished to achieve cost neutrality but
constrain the rate of interest so that it was below a 4% positive rate (which we suggest
would be close to a commercial rate), it would need to introduce a repayment rate 
of at least 9.4%. Cost neutrality with a 3.1% interest rate could only be achieved with 
a 14.4% repayment rate.
41
‘National’ in this context
means England-wide.
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81 The scenarios in Table 4 opposite look only at combinations that are projected to be 
cost neutral to government – it would of course be possible for government to continue
to share part of the cohort risk whilst introducing both a real rate of interest and 
a higher repayment rate. The overall system thus produced would remain progressive,
with higher earning graduates receiving a lower overall subsidy (or no subsidy at all).
82 We propose, therefore, that such combinations are considered as part of a rolling
programme of reforms, as a means of maximising the savings to the Exchequer, 
and the amount that can be recycled back into the university system, whilst retaining
the benefits of a government-backed loan system.
d Other possible reforms
83 There are various other ways in which this contribution system could be developed 
to serve particular policy aims. For example, it would be possible to extend by 
two years the repayment period for all graduates (whilst retaining an amnesty after, 
say, 25 years) to create a ‘redistributive tilt’ within the system. The effect of this is
illustrated in Figure 11above.42 Because it would generate additional income, moreover,
it would be possible to use this income to increase the government subsidy, thereby
helping to limit the amount of remaining costs that have to be borne by the cohort 
of borrowers. However, this reform could be highly problematic – it introduces a new
driver for repayments (years), which would be difficult to explain and could be difficult
to calculate for those with sporadic incomes. This option would also impose further
opportunity costs for graduates, which may restrict institutions’ ability to raise funds
from philanthropic giving. Given these issues, we would not recommend this reform.
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84 A further option is to introduce incentives for early repayment of loans in full 
(for example, a 10% discount). This could impact in the short term both on the RAB 
costs associated with loans and potentially on total government borrowing (the national
debt) – if repayments were sufficient in scale to positively affect the balance between
loan repayments and loans distributed in a given year. However, as the IFS has shown, 
in order for such a scheme to result in savings to the public purse over the long term, 
it would rely on graduates who would otherwise receive higher subsidies taking
advantage of the lower discount.43 This adaption of the loan system may also be seen 
to confer additional advantages to those with the family resources to pay off the full 
loan (or a substantial part of it) early. It is probably unnecessary to provide additional
incentives for early repayment if a real rate of interest is introduced, since this in 
itself is likely to provide a significant incentive for some students to use alternative
resources to cover their contribution to tuition and/or maintenance costs.
85 In conclusion, given the urgent need to reduce the RAB charge, there is a need 
to introduce a real rate of interest at least at the level of the cost of government
borrowing but below a commercial rate. A higher repayment rate is one way to increase
government savings on the RAB charge whilst limiting the interest rate. In deciding 
on the appropriate combination of these reforms, we would expect government 
to consider the effects on graduates’ private resources – in particular, to ensure that 
any increase in the marginal rate of repayment would be sustainable for graduates 
in future macro-economic scenarios – and to evaluate the effects of reforms on
participation over time.
e Monitoring the effects of reforms
86 Of primary concern is the effect these changes might have on participation. Such
effects are very difficult to predict – whilst recent work by the IFS suggests that 
an increase in upfront costs of higher education on its own has a negative effect 
on participation, there is no existing research on how responsive participation 
is to changes in deferred costs. It is for these reasons that we have highlighted the
importance of providing prospective students and the wider public with clear messages
about the benefits of income-contingent repayments; proposed that any rate of 
interest be kept below a commercial rate; and propose any reforms to student grants
(targeted at students from lower income households) are deferred (see below). The
government should continue to monitor the effects of such reforms on participation.
87 These reforms could also result in changes to loan take-up. It is certainly 
conceivable that the take-up rate of loans to support the graduate contribution and 
the take-up rate of maintenance loans could be reduced, especially among those
confident of higher lifetime earnings and/or with access to the resources to pay
upfront.44 Whilst overall changes in loan take-up could be monitored, it would not be
possible to tell whether this would result in relatively higher taxpayer costs because 
of future earnings.
88 As a final point, we note that the student support arrangements in Northern Ireland 
and Wales are currently broadly similar to those in England. We believe it is important
for this parity to be maintained.
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f An option for the loan book: wholesale front-end funding
89 Even with these reforms to the student loan repayment system, issues about the size 
of the national debt would remain. One option that has been proposed to deal more
directly with this is that of wholesale front-end funding. Under this model, loans would
be entirely provided for by private finance, with the interest rate reflecting a cohort 
risk premium and administrative charge. This option is based on the Hungarian model.
It has therefore been shown to be administratively feasible on a smaller scale, and
could represent a significant improvement on the current policy of selling off ‘tranches’
of student loan debt. The model has not, however, been tested on such a scale as would
be implied by even the current loan book for English and EU students, and the appetite
of private finance for funding loans in this way is unclear. So any model, and the
maximum amount of the total loan book it could support, would need to be subject 
to further expert consideration. A new portfolio of loans with a real rate of interest may,
however, be more attractive than the current student loan book – although it is likely 
a significant amount of ‘old system’ student loan debt would remain within the system.
It is not entirely clear, however, that loans financed in this way would be removed 
from the government’s balance sheet and would thereby reduce public sector net 
debt, which would be the principal reason for introducing such a scheme. 
90 There are other issues to consider with this scheme. Under this model, the ONS
regulates the level of government guarantee (subsidy) and determines at what 
level this would designate the scheme either ‘private’ or ‘public’. If the government
subsidy were to increase beyond this designated level then the system would become 
a publicly-financed loan system. Therefore this system might reduce the flexibility 
that is available under a publicly-financed loan scheme for the government to increase
its ‘share’ of unpaid debt (for example, by reducing the interest rate or the repayment
rate). The level of cohort risk is also shaped by the need to ensure this package is
attractive to potential purchasers.
V Models for funding a contribution above the guaranteed government loan
91 Comparisons between the US and UK systems would suggest that in terms of equity,
access and regulatory controls available to the government, the optimal funding
solution would be to continue to have a government-backed loan scheme to support
graduate contributions up to a regulated maximum. The government is in the best
position to secure favourable borrowing terms as well as the best position to safeguard
repayment or contribution conditions for graduates. Furthermore, a national public
system does not rule out the introduction of private finance on a regulated basis, for
example through the sale of loan books – either upfront or at a later stage. A national
structure also provides stability for universities and their students, by reducing their
exposure to risk to finance a core part of their activities. 
92 Reducing the subsidy on loans may make it possible for the government to support 
a higher graduate contribution without a significant increase in the measures 
of national debt, either by increasing the attractiveness of the rate of repayment 
or by making the loan book a more attractive proposition for private finance. 
93 We recognise that future governments may face some pressure to limit the size 
of the loan book they are willing to take on or guarantee, especially in the context 
of significant public and political concern about the size of the national debt overall. 
In determining the amount it can afford to fund, the government will need to make
assumptions about loan take-up by students and pricing strategies by institutions that
will be difficult to model using historic data. Given the fiscal climate and accompanying
scrutiny of public finances, governments may need to make ‘high-risk’ assumptions
about these two factors.
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94 There are other reasons why government might want to limit the amount of loans
provided through a national scheme. First, increasing the size of the overall loan book
increases the overall cohort risk. The government has the option of absorbing part of 
this risk, but its flexibility is limited. For example, under a fully publicly-funded scheme
flexibility is limited by the need to protect the fisc; where there is wholesale front-end
funding from private sources with a government guarantee, there may be further
limitations on the subsidy because the government has to ensure the commitment is 
not accounted for as public borrowing (based on terms negotiated with the ONS or other
regulator). A full-scale private sale of the student loan portfolio risks an increased cost
for borrowers in line with increased financing costs. 
95 The government is also likely to be particularly concerned about allowing all private
contributions to be financed through a national scheme if there is significant variability 
in the level of the graduate contribution. Where there is a national cohort risk premium
there is at least the prospect that students at institutions where lower graduate
contributions are set will be faced with a comparative increase in the length of 
repayment (through an increased interest rate or a combination of this and an increased
repayment period) simply because of an increase in the contribution at other institutions.
The effects of this may be politically manageable up to a certain level but might appear
inequitable in any scenario where graduate contribution levels differ considerably. 
96 The government will also face competing pressures in determining where to target 
any expansion of the loan system. There will be strong arguments in favour of increased 
full-time loans to support the graduate contribution to tuition, to help the sustainability 
of the system; in favour of increased maintenance loans to reflect realistic living costs;
and in favour of expanding loans to other groups of students (for example, part-time 
and postgraduate students, which we discuss below). Any one or a combination of these
would increase the overall size of the loan book and the cohort risk. 
97 These factors suggest that there may be a limit to the maximum graduate contribution
(by full-time home and EU undergraduates) that the government is prepared to support
through loans. The maximum which the government considers to be acceptable for 
a national scheme may not, in the long term, match the level of investment that some
institutions state they need to secure sustainable investment in some or all of their
courses, and which they believe the market will be in a position to provide (subject to
safeguards to ensure appropriate participation). 
98 Because of this, it has been suggested that models might be developed, which would
allow universities (either collectively or individually) to set a higher level of graduate
contribution, and potentially to take on additional risks in doing so, without increasing 
the cost and risk to the government and the national cohort of borrowers. 
99 There are a number of potential limitations and disadvantages associated with the
development of any funding structure incorporating these models. We explore some 
of these issues below. Further analysis of any potential adverse consequences on
students, graduates and universities – particularly with respect to promoting social
mobility – and of the mechanisms that might address these, would be required before 
any such models could be introduced. We do not, therefore, support any of the models
discussed below in their current form.
a Universities cover the RAB charge of additional loans
100 One option for funding a higher private contribution without additional resource costs 
to government would be to allow universities to charge beyond the maximum loan
available from government (or through a government-backed scheme) for some or 
all of their courses, but for these universities to pass the estimated resource costs 
of these loans back to government. The university would therefore be paying the RAB
charge for any of its students who took out the additional loan. These funds would 
have to be sufficient for the government to meet in full its share of the additional costs 
of government loans above the standard maximum, whilst still allowing all eligible
students to borrow at the rate of interest set for this level. This option assumes there 
is limited concern with the level of overall government borrowing.
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101 The attractiveness of this option is that it would not depend on an institution being able
to raise funds from private sources. On the other hand, it does represent an additional
risk to government (if the funds passed back to government were less than the
additional public funds required to support higher loans) or could penalise universities
(if these funds were higher than the public resource costs). There is, moreover, every
likelihood that the number of students able to make the additional contribution through
resources other than a loan would vary between institutions. One way round this issue
would be for government to assume that all students liable for a higher graduate
contribution borrowed the full amount through a loan and to levy funds accordingly.
However, this is unlikely to make this model attractive to all institutions, particularly
those where a relatively large proportion of students chose to pay upfront.
b Universities responsible for financing arrangements
102 A number of other models have been suggested for funding a higher graduate
contribution than that supported by a government-backed loan, which would all make
universities more directly responsible for financing arrangements for their students. 
A potentially positive element to such an evolution of the system would be that it would
increase institutions’ stake in the future prosperity of their students, which could be an
important long-term connection. There are, however, a number of potential unintended
negative consequences of introducing such structures into the higher education
system. We reiterate that further analysis of the behavioural effects and consequences
of any of these options would be required before they could be introduced. Based 
on our assessment of the issues, we suggest that the development of any of these
models would present a number of challenges, and might require the development 
of mechanisms to ‘smooth’ the effects of different institutions’ capacity to absorb 
risk. In particular, it is not currently clear how such options might meet the following
conditions, which we believe would be critical under any of these models:
a There would need to be clear mechanisms in place to safeguard against the 
unintended consequences of such models on other important policy aims, such as
widening participation.
b Prospective students would need to be provided with clear information to combat 
any increased complexity. 
c Financing arrangements would need to draw on comparable and reliable information
about graduate earnings profiles for different courses.
d Any repayments would need to be affordable to graduates across the sector.
i A ‘trust’ for part of the loan book
103 One suggested model is that of a ‘trust’ for student loans held by a group of universities
and applying only to loans for contributions above the maximum government loan
available. This trust would ‘purchase’ the loan portfolio from government and draw 
in private sector finance. The government could continue to hold some stake in such 
a system through the provision of a regulated subsidy. Further expert investigation 
of this option would almost certainly be needed to clarify whether or not such loans
would be classified as being off the government’s balance sheet.
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ii ‘Deferred fees’
104 A second model is that of ‘deferred’ fees (or contributions).45 Under this model, 
the part of the contribution funded through a government-backed loan, and 
any maintenance loans, would be paid through the current income-contingent
repayment arrangements. If the graduate repays their government-backed loans, 
they begin to repay the ‘deferred fee’ element and these repayments are received 
by the university. Thus, in its pure form, the university only receives the income
associated with deferred fees once loans payable under a national scheme are 
repaid and if their graduates earn enough within a set period. The latest earnings
profiles produced by the IFS suggest that a graduate would take on average 
around 15.4 years to repay the average debt accumulated through current fee 
and maintenance loans provided by government.46 So even if there were no change 
in the availability of government loans, it would be some time before universities 
could begin to see the benefit from their own deferred fees. A modification might
therefore be needed to this model, to promote financial sustainability for institutions.
One possibility is that the deferment of income could be mitigated by selling an 
index-linked cash flow, for example, to a pension fund.
iii Institutional loans
105 A third model would see either a single institution or a group of institutions providing
institutional loans in partnership with a commercial bank. This would either involve
institutions negotiating loan terms on the students’ behalf (and underwriting these
loans), but the loan would be given to the student directly from the bank and would 
be repaid to the bank, or a loan negotiated between banks and institutions, with
institutions then funding the cost of the additional contribution for students, and
graduates repaying their own institution. The outcome would be the same – with
universities receiving the income straight away.
c Regulatory issues
106 Under any of the three models for universities to take responsibility for financing
arrangements, the regulation necessary to ensure the conditions stated above were
met would need to be carefully considered. The objective of maintaining institutional
autonomy would need to be balanced against protecting the interests of both students
and graduates across the sector. The government and universities have a strong
interest in fair access for students, and would want to continue to ensure that any
arrangements do not damage participation. The government and universities may 
also be concerned about the opportunity costs for graduates that could result from 
any larger overall loan repayments. 
107 There are several elements that could be subject to regulation, which we believe 
the Review should consider if any of these options are explored further. The analysis 
of the issues below highlights some of the problematic elements of the models
discussed above, and we restate that Universities UK does not support any of these
models in their current form.
i Information on graduate earnings
108 Comparable and reliable information about graduate earnings would be vital to 
ensure a level playing field for institutions or groups of institutions competing 
for private finance, and could be helpful as a means of informing student choice. 
If banks are to offer loans to individual institutions or to groups of institutions, 
it is likely that they would do so on the basis of an institution’s overall credit (that is, 
the basis on which they already lend to universities), together with an assessment 
of the likely graduate earnings of students at that institution. The same sort of
assessment is likely to be undertaken by any purchaser of an index-linked cash 
flow under a ‘deferred fee’ system. 
45
For a fuller discussion of 
this model see N Shephard,
Deferred fees for universities
(available at www.oxford-
man.ox.ac.uk/~nshephard/
defer111109.pdf).
46
This is based on the central
earnings growth projection
used in the IFS modelling 
for Universities UK
(www.ifs.org.uk/docs/
uuk_presentation10.pdf).
Universities UK Submission to the Independent Review of HE Funding and Student Finance
109 Any of the models discussed above would therefore require better information on
graduate earnings profiles. There are two problems with the information currently
available. The sixth-month Destination of Leavers in Higher Education (DLHE) survey
achieves a relatively high response rate, and is useful to universities in keeping in 
touch with alumni, but is commonly acknowledged to be conducted too early to capture
graduate destinations meaningfully. The longitudinal DLHE survey (conducted twice 
to date, in 2006 and 2008 with a further survey planned for 2010, and taken 3.5 years
after graduation) is based on a 5% sample of graduates and has a very low response
rate. HEFCE and HESA are currently reviewing both approaches, supported by a review
group which includes Universities UK representation, but improving the quality and
reliability of this data, and enhancing it with data from other sources (for example, 
the HMRC for earnings data) will be an important and necessary step regardless 
of other reforms. We also note the possibility of developing the Labour Force Survey 
to include useful information in this respect (for example, place and course of study).
110 However, even with improved information about earnings profiles of past graduates,
this will only ever be an imperfect predictor of what will happen in the future, either 
to individual graduates or to particular cohorts. Institutions, like government, would
necessarily be taking on an element of unknown risk.
ii The terms of repayment (including rate of interest)
111 We have emphasised in our proposals that loans to support the graduate contribution
should be income-contingent and should protect low earners. Mortgage-style
repayments, with a fixed repayment period, would reduce institutional risk but would 
be regressive, because lower paid graduates would pay a higher proportion of their
income. There is also the possibility that they would act as a deterrent to some
students; or a deterrent to graduates to choose lower-earning career paths. 
112 Even if additional institutional loans were income-contingent, however, the question
would remain as to whether universities could be permitted to increase the monthly
repayment rate of their graduates to ensure payments to their own loan scheme 
would begin straight away, or would be required to defer repayment until any national
loan obligations had been met. The former could result in a significant increase in
monthly repayments. 
113 If institutions were to negotiate borrowing terms with the private sector, part of the 
risk could be shared with the cohort of borrowers (reflecting the proposed reforms 
to the national scheme). The level of risk could be regulated – for example, government
could seek to ensure that the interest rate was no higher than that on loans available
through a government-backed scheme. 
114 There remains a risk that a system containing both government and institutional 
loans (or a variant of loans) could be confusing to potential students. If any such models
are developed, clear information should be provided to students about the finance
available to them at different institutions.
iii The extent of institutional risk
115 If there is some regulation of the level of interest payable by the cohort of borrowers,
then this could mean different institutions facing differential borrowing terms 
to finance this part of the graduate contribution. Institutions accountable for public
funds (including research funds) could be required by HEFCE to meet certain 
conditions before entering into such arrangements. Institutions will in any case want 
to consider how entering into new borrowing agreements would impact on their
existing commitments.
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116 However, whilst this would help ensure such arrangements did not undermine 
the financial sustainability of institutions, it has been argued that this would unfairly
restrict the ability of some institutions to increase the graduate contribution on
particular courses where both market demand and future earnings profiles were
comparatively strong. Even where institutions were permitted to borrow in this 
way, differential borrowing terms could mean significant differences in the level 
of income achieved through setting the same level of graduate contribution. 
117 One option to address this might be for private finance arrangements to be negotiated
at a course level rather than at an institutional level. Any incentives for collaborative
borrowing arrangements could then be developed at course level, rather than
necessarily between institutions across their courses. It is plausible that such
collaborative models could counteract some of the differential effects that other
student characteristics (such as socio-economic background and prior attainment)
have on future earnings. Both the effects of such characteristics, and the impact 
of any collaborative models, would need further investigation.
118 The effect the development of such models could have on the burden and costs 
for institutions should also be recognised, particularly if institutions themselves 
took on the task of tracking graduates and collecting repayments. The resources
required to manage this are likely to differ in scale and nature from those required 
to manage bursaries.
VI Maintenance support
a Government support
119 We propose that the reforms to government-backed loan repayment arrangements
discussed above would apply to maintenance loans as well as loans to support the
graduate contribution to tuition.
120 Alongside its expenditure on subsidised loans, the government also commits around
£1.05bn cash expenditure on maintenance grants. Reducing the RAB cost as described
in the IFS modelling based on a £5,000 average tuition fee loan could result in a small 
shift in the balance of current expenditure towards expenditure on grants – assuming
there were no change in this element. The effect could be amplified if the take-up 
of loans decreased.
121 The government currently makes policy decisions about the balance of grants 
and loans for different groups of students, depending on their household income. 
122 The overall balance of loans and non-repayable support should continue to be
considered under any revised framework. As a policy instrument, grants and other 
non-repayable support serve to address risk aversion among students and offer 
the opportunity to reduce the future opportunity costs faced by graduates – shortening
the length of repayments compared with covering all costs through a loan. 
123 Because of the uncertain effects on participation of the proposed changes to the loan
system, we recommend that any significant changes to the government grant system
and the level of maintenance loans be delayed until the effects are better understood.
We also note that savings generated through, for example, returning to the 2006 
grant thresholds would in all likelihood be smaller than the savings generated through
reform to the changes to the loan repayment structure described above.
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b Bursaries
124 The reforms in 2006 showed that institutions were prepared to go significantly beyond
the mandatory minimum requirements and develop targeted schemes which satisfied
the Office for Fair Access (OFFA) that the fees they charged would not damage access.
Universities have also continued to invest in access programmes. As we noted in 
our first submission, there is evidence that more needs to be done to communicate 
the support available at different institutions and inform student choice. In particular,
universities will need to show how bursaries fit in to the total package of support 
and how this allows students to meet the costs they can anticipate. However, take-up 
of bursaries has been shown to have notably improved in the second year of the variable
fee regime. This is likely to be due in part to improvements to the process for allowing
students’ household income data (collected to assess eligibility for state means-tested
support) to be shared with institutions. There is significant value in terms of simplicity
for the student and in terms of minimising the burden on institutions in such an
arrangement, although the administrative processes underpinning it must be robust
and reliable.
125 As noted in a number of previous submissions to the Review’s call for evidence, there 
is a strong correlation between prior attainment and participation in university, and
financial aid alone is not sufficient to promote participation. A future system should
therefore support universities in investing a range of resources – including donations
from alumni – in both access and financial aid initiatives. These initiatives should 
be located within a broader access strategy, which would include the development 
of universities’ links with schools (as supported in the current Widening Participation
Strategic Assessments sent to HEFCE). 
126 The current requirement placed on universities to provide bursaries at a minimum 
level should therefore be replaced with a system whereby universities are free 
to develop their own financial aid policies, within the context of an overall strategy 
to widen participation. We would work constructively to ensure appropriate oversight 
of these strategies is achieved. This should avoid the monitoring of the proportion 
of (additional) fee income spent on bursaries and other access projects, which may not
reflect the range of institutional investment in such measures, and may not encourage
investment from business (for example, in scholarships) or from donors. It is important
that such investments are recognised, as they can be a significant additional source 
of ‘graduate contributions’ of a different kind: students who elect to pay upfront can
choose to support others later through contributing towards student bursaries and
access initiatives at their former institutions. HEFCE Widening Participation Strategic
assessments, or similar assessments of overall widening participation strategies,
could include information on universities’ fundraising activities in relation to financial
aid and access measures.
127 The trends in institutional fundraising suggest it is reasonable to anticipate that – 
over the long term – more income might be raised from graduates and other donors 
to support bursaries and scholarships in future. In 2007–08 UK universities reported
securing more from fundraising than ever before. They secured £682m in new funds 
in 2007–08; this is an increase from £442m in 2005–06 and £531m in 2006–07.47 There
was also an increase in the median level of new funds secured by those institutions
taking part in the government’s matched funding scheme (from £743,000 in 2006–07 
to £905,000 in 2007–08). This suggests a positive relationship between an increase 
in investment in these activities and fundraising outcomes. Continued support from
government for institutional fundraising through the matched funding scheme or 
other similar initiatives would therefore represent a valuable and efficient long-term
investment in the sector as a whole, and in opportunities for prospective students.
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128 A national bursary scheme which redistributed income raised from students/graduates
at one institution (through loans supporting the graduate contribution) to students 
at another would not be a desirable addition to the system. A fixed additional amount
distributed through a central ‘pot’ could merely act as an inefficient way of getting
funding to a student. It would be unlikely to achieve the aim of more equitably meeting
student ‘need’, since there would remain some differences between the costs that
students faced depending on where (and what) they studied. A more reasonable
approach is to allow institutions to supplement national student support with their 
own bursaries and scholarships, which reflect the needs of their students and their
strategic priorities. This goes beyond the value of bursaries offered. For example, 
the use of bursaries to support retention might be more appropriate to one institution
than another. 
VII Supporting part-time undergraduate students
129 Universities UK supports as a long-term aim the movement towards a system of
student support that is indifferent as to the incentives to pursue full-time or part-time
undergraduate study. As we have argued above, it is important that the system 
provides a high quality experience and high quality outcomes for all the students who
participate within it. This student population is increasingly diverse, and will continue 
to be so if higher education is to continue to meet the needs of students and society. 
130 The 2004 reforms introduced the principle of a graduate contribution for full-time 
home and EU undergraduate students, but did not extend this to other groups such 
as high-intensity part-time first degree students. This had the effect not only of
ensuring that part-time students remained reliant on upfront payments or employer
contributions to undertake a course, but also made it more difficult for institutions 
to charge part-time fees pro rated to full-time fees, and thus secure the quality 
of the experience for these students. There was a significant concern that increasing
funding for part-time students would merely mean government funding substituting 
for funding from employers (that is, it would create ‘deadweight costs’ to the state). 
The heterogeneity of the part-time population (in terms of age, prior qualifications 
and qualification aims) also made estimating the costs of extending grants and 
income-contingent loans on a pro rata basis exceptionally difficult.
131 We would not wish to see any expansion of the student finance system funded 
through a reduction in the level of loans and grants available to full-time students. 
We believe that the reforms to student finance proposed above would facilitate the
ability of government to devise an affordable solution for the expansion of loans 
to other groups of students, although we recognise the challenges of doing so in 
the context of constrained public finances.
132 We propose there are practical steps that should be taken now to identify the cohort 
of part-time students that should be targeted in terms of increased student support, 
to produce the greatest benefit from an extension of some or all of the support 
available to full-time students on a pro rata basis. The definition of ‘greatest benefit’
should be broad, encompassing the most effective delivery of high-quality provision 
and high-quality outcomes to all those who participate in higher education or have 
the potential to do so. In determining what support should be made available to 
which cohort, the differences in the circumstances of part-time students should be
considered. The characteristics of the cohort could be expected to include intensity 
of study, qualification aim, and highest qualification on entry. 
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133 We would expect this work to be carried out by a group of sector experts, 
including representatives of a wide range of institutions (in terms of the proportion 
of undergraduates studying part-time), and representatives from the business 
community as appropriate. The identification of this cohort should draw on work
undertaken recently to better understand the characteristics of part-time students 
and the effects of differential funding arrangements. This would include, for example,
work by London Economics for Million+, which explores the impact of changing 
student finance arrangements on resource flows across the sector, and in which the
costs of extending support to one cohort of part-time students have been analysed.48
We would also highlight a forthcoming report for Universities UK, which will 
explore the characteristics of the current part-time population (including levels and
types of funding), and examine the wide range of issues affecting part-time supply 
and demand.49
134 The question of how to maximise employer support is likely to be particularly important
in identifying this cohort. Among its findings, this Universities UK report will include 
an assessment of the characteristics of part-time students most likely to benefit from
employer support for their studies. The study will show that, for example, high levels 
of prior qualification are positively associated with employer contributions. It is
plausible that employers would want to continue to ‘invest’ in these employees even 
if income-contingent loans were available. Furthermore, some universities have
developed close relationships with local providers to deliver bespoke training 
needs (for example, in one university 80% of part-time provision is delivered in the
workplace).50 Not only would such institutions be in a good position to set the level 
of the graduate contribution to ensure continued close engagement between employers
and universities, but the employers themselves would retain an incentive to fund their
own employees (assuming such provision had been developed with their needs in
mind). It should also be recognised that employer support for higher education can 
be provided in a range of ways, including through work placements, sponsorship, and
curriculum development. We would support appropriate incentives to encourage
employer contributions of this kind.
135 We do not underestimate the practical difficulties associated with implementing 
such reforms, for example, modelling the likely costs of loan provision. However, the
arguments in favour of this policy are strong, particularly with respect to provision 
of loans to support a graduate contribution for part-time students, which could both
increase the opportunities for participation (especially, for example, among those
seeking to retrain for alternative employment) and, potentially, increase the resources
for institutions offering this provision. The effects of any reforms to student finance 
on stimulating supply and demand, improving completion rates, and changing the
shape of the part-time student population should be monitored. 
136 Consideration should be given in parallel to the extent to which other changes might 
be required to ensure the sector is offering the provision that best meets the needs 
of students and society. The forthcoming Universities UK report on part-time students
will provide important insights into the factors that shape the supply of part-time study. 
137 We note that the sector’s position on issues such as a change in the way public 
funding is allocated will continue to evolve through relevant consultations such as 
the HEFCE review of the teaching funding method. Further policy reforms geared 
to the appropriate stimulation of supply could, however, include:
a Improved access for students to information about part-time provision
b The provision of appropriate financial support directly to institutions, including support
of institutions’ ongoing relationship with employers 
c The information available to institutions, especially related to part-time demand and
potential gaps in provision.
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VIII Supporting taught postgraduate students
138 In the light of the Smith Review51 of postgraduate education, it would also be desirable
to extend the support available for taught postgraduate students, in particular, to 
help ensure fair access to qualifications which increasingly secure a premium in the 
job market. Participation in postgraduate education has grown rapidly in the last
decade and at a faster rate than undergraduate education. This is now a major area 
of business for most universities. In addition there are a small number of institutions
which are exclusively postgraduate. Much of the growth in this type of provision has
been driven by a rise in international students. However, for UK-domiciled students,
participation in postgraduate education has risen at a slower rate than participation in
undergraduate education (a 14% increase since 1997–98, compared to a 25% increase 
at undergraduate level). 
139 The Smith Review argues that ‘if the UK is to compete in a global knowledge economy
and capitalise on new, emerging industries, it is likely that there will be increasing
demand for the UK workforce to be trained to postgraduate level’.52 The review notes
evidence from a range of sources that the ability to recruit high quality postgraduate
researchers, and the strength of the research base, is a key factor for many businesses
in choosing to locate in the UK. The value that employers place on postgraduate level
skills is borne out by the wage premium associated with postgraduate qualifications
(lifetime earnings are 15% higher, on average, for those with a masters qualification,
compared with a first degree, and 23% higher for those with a PhD).
140 Postgraduate fees are largely unregulated, and there is no universal system of support
for such students. 60% of taught postgraduate students receive no support towards 
fee or living costs. A small number of postgraduate students access Professional
Career Development Loans (PCDLs), provided by banks at a commercial rate of interest
(with the interest paid by government during the period of study and for one month 
after completion) but there is no information about the number of students who
unsuccessfully apply for such loans. Contributors to the Smith Review suggested that
possible reasons for low take-up of PCDLs include ineligibility and concerns about 
the rate of interest and repayment terms. 
141 There is relatively little data about the characteristics of the postgraduate cohort, 
or about motivations and barriers to study at this level, including whether the cost 
of postgraduate study and the lack of student support are factors in dissuading
students from pursuing further study. In particular, as the Smith Review points out, 
the issue of fair access to postgraduate education has been relatively neglected:
‘The report by The Panel on Fair Access to the Professions brought this sharply into 
focus – recognising the connection between access to postgraduate study and entry 
into professional careers. As postgraduate level skills are increasingly required 
in a knowledge-driven economy, it is important that the opportunity to benefit from
postgraduate study is open to everyone.’53
142 Notwithstanding the evident need to increase the information available about
postgraduate students, and to understand better the supply and demand issues at 
play in this arena, there appear to be powerful arguments both in terms of economic
interests and access for increasing the support available for postgraduate study, 
in order to incentivise participation at this level. If this does not prove possible, other
changes may need to be considered to mitigate the potentially adverse consequences
on taught postgraduate participation resulting from any changes to the undergraduate
fee and support structure.
143 It would be important to consider patterns in the mode of study if any policy to 
extend student support to taught postgraduate students is considered. We note that 
the majority of UK and EU postgraduate students at English HEIs study part-time: 
in 2008–09 68% of these students were studying part-time; 72% of UK taught
postgraduate students were studying part-time, and between 2007–08 and 2008–09
there was a 13.5% increase in part-time taught postgraduate entrants.54
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I Introduction
144 We will offer a more detailed consideration of the principles underpinning HEFCE
funding in our response to HEFCE’s review of the teaching funding method. However, 
in this part of our submission we briefly consider the following:
a The role of HEFCE teaching funding and the benefits of its delivery through 
a block grant.
b The potential effects of a reformed graduate contribution framework on 
HEFCE funding.
c Some of the ideas for changes to the distribution of this funding that have been
discussed (or may gain traction in future), where the primary drivers include 
increasing quality and stimulating change. 
145 One question for the Review is whether initiatives developed in the light of specific
funding constraints and against a backdrop of severe imbalance of supply and demand
can and should be used as the basis for funding in the future. We consider here some 
of the proposals for using public funding as a lever to increase the movement of
students and associated funding within the system. Issues around the constraints 
on overall capacity imposed by public funding of both institutions and students are
considered in more detail in part 4 of this section. 
II The place of HEFCE funding in English HEIs
146 Universities are autonomous, self-governing charities – supported by the state but 
not within the public sector. This is reflected in the diversity of their income sources – 
as noted in HEFCE’s submission to the Review’s first call for evidence, funding council
grants accounted for 35.4% of English Universities’ income in 2007–08 (down from
38.0% in 2005–06), and that percentage has fallen further to 33.8% in 2008–09.55 There 
is also some variation across the sector in the proportion of income (for teaching and
research) derived from this source, as illustrated in Figure 12 overleaf.
147 The very great majority of HEFCE teaching funding is currently distributed as ‘similar
funding for similar activity’, and is linked to the number of students and the relative
costs of different subjects. There are well-rehearsed issues about how to determine 
the costs of activity and the assumptions to be made about other resources for
teaching, which HEFCE will be seeking to resolve through its ongoing review of the
teaching funding method. 
148 Within the teaching grant there is also some targeted funding to recognise additional
costs, and, importantly, ‘contested’ funding for strategic growth in student numbers
(institutions bid against defined criteria). 
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3 HEFCE funding
A summary of some key developments in public funding for institutions
Our view of the benefits of HEFCE teaching funding and of its delivery through 
a block grant
An initial discussion of the potential effects of a reformed graduate contribution
framework on HEFCE funding
Our initial analysis of some of the options for reforming funding to stimulate 
quality and change
Part 3 of this 
section sets out:
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149 The system does allow for a reduction in funding over time at an institution that does
not manage student numbers to match (within the tolerance band) historic levels 
of HEFCE funding. However, because HEFCE controls the envelope of institutional
funds, it is able to make strategic decisions about how to manage public funds to
maintain a high quality HE system in England. HEFCE retains considerable discretion
over the allocation of funding through the Strategic Development Fund and through
moderation funding.
150 HEFCE funding sits alongside the cost of loans and grants as part of a package 
of taxpayer support to universities and their students. We recognise that the place 
of HEFCE funding can be expected to evolve in response to changes in patterns of
participation, and in consultation with the sector. Mechanisms to account for receipt 
of public funding from HEFCE should also continue to evolve to reflect any changing
balance of public and private funding, and any further differentiation between
institutions, to ensure that they remain proportionate and risk-based. There are,
however, a number of features of this funding that we believe are particularly 
beneficial to the sector as a whole:
a It explicitly acknowledges the public benefits of higher education alongside those
accruing to the individual participant.
b The majority of HEFCE teaching funding is provided through a block grant, which 
allows institutions to be responsive to student need – investing strategically, and
responding to changing local and national needs and circumstances, whilst managing
fluctuations in the market. Delivering the majority of public funding to institutions
through a block grant avoids the funding method being used to over-engineer provision
or as a form of workforce planning. 
c It is an efficient way of ensuring that public funding for teaching reflects some costs
which the market cannot and should not be expected to bear. These include both 
the costs of delivering particular subjects and the additional costs associated with
recruiting and retaining particular groups of students. Support for these activities
through public funding helps universities meet important economic and social policy
aims such as widening participation.
Figure 12 
Total HEFCE funding 
as a proportion of 
total income for higher
education institutions 
in England, 2008–09
Source: Finance Plus 2010
(HESA, 2010)
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d It is an efficient way of ensuring that incentives can be put in place for completion. 
The completion rates for UK students are among the highest of any OECD country.56
e It helps protect against volatility of funding that might threaten, for example, 
provision in geographic or subject areas which become temporarily unpopular. 
A certain degree of stability is desirable to ensure that universities can plan 
in a reasonably long-term manner.
f Funding can be provided to support capacity building, for example in the development 
of employer co-funded provision.  
151 We are not aware of any models where all public funding for teaching has 
successfully been driven solely by the market. The only jurisdiction to have introduced
such a ‘voucher’ system as the principal mechanism for funding higher education – 
the State of Colorado – declared the system a failure, and even then only after it had
adapted the system so that the state could reward institutions that delivered provision
of high strategic importance (the ‘fee for service’ element).
152 The administrative costs of introducing a ‘voucher’ scheme of this kind should not 
be underestimated. As Universities UK pointed out in a review of the funding options 
for higher education, published in 2000,57 there are a number of difficulties inherent 
in developing such a system, including determining how vouchers would be allocated;
how their value would be determined; and how overall expenditure would be controlled. 
153 One of the arguments in favour of vouchers – that students would better understand
the value of the provision they are accessing – might nevertheless provide a useful
lesson for future policy. It should be possible, without introducing vouchers, to improve
the information available to students about the source of funding for their teaching, 
and in particular, to demonstrate the amount that public funding contributes alongside
their own contribution.
III The impact of a revised graduate contribution
154 Some consideration will need to be given to the way the graduate contribution
framework described above might interact with public funding. Universities UK 
will consider this issue further as part of its submissions to HEFCE’s ongoing review 
of the teaching funding method. However, we offer some brief reflections here. 
155 The proposals we make with regard to the graduate contribution may lead in the long
term to some liberalisation of the price controls currently in operation in relation 
to undergraduate education for home and EU students. In order to secure the desired
outcomes relating to quality, participation (including social mobility) and sustainability,
these might need to be accompanied by mechanisms to move student numbers 
(and associated HEFCE funding) more fluidly within the system. The options for
achieving this are problematic, as discussed below. In any case, active involvement 
of institutions in discussions with HEFCE about the overall shape of provision, 
including overall provision at regional level, should remain a feature of the system.
156 Under the current HEFCE funding model, the ‘fee assumption’ remains at the old
‘standard’ fee level (currently £1,310). HEFCE has indicated that this fee assumption
should be revised.
157 There is a difficult balance to be struck between providing appropriate incentives 
for institutions to raise funds (to limit the flow of public funding to institutions which 
can raise the same amount from private contributions), and ensuring appropriate
funding to support provision for which it is not feasible or appropriate to depend 
on the market to meet the costs (including support of widening participation policies).
We note that such issues will be considered as part of HEFCE’s review of the teaching
funding method.
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158 The overall effect of any revision on the distribution of funding between institutions
would depend on decisions about the appropriate resource level for particular types 
of provision. A real challenge is to ensure that public investment and institutional
strategy support the long-term sustainability of teaching provision, and we note that
HEFCE has indicated it would seek to revise the current price bands with reference 
to TRAC data, which seeks to recognise the full sustainable costs of teaching provision.
An issue that would remain with this approach is that the full economic costs of
teaching in particular subjects (measured by TRAC) are likely to vary significantly
across the sector. 
159 In considering options in this area, due attention should be paid to the potential 
effects of any changes to the teaching funding method on all publicly-funded students,
including part-time and taught postgraduate students, and on institutions with high
proportions of such students, in order to protect participation and the overall quality 
of the student experience across the sector.
IV Analysis of other options for reform
a Making the current system more responsive to ‘market dynamism’
160 The current HEFCE consultation on the principles underpinning the teaching funding
method reflects a concern that there may be insufficient responsiveness to ‘market
dynamism’, or the changes in demand for places in particular institutions over time, 
in the current funding model.58
161 One way to adapt the funding method to increase dynamism would be through 
an adaptation of the contract range mechanism to ensure that funding was made 
more responsive to changes in demand. This could involve what would appear to 
be a relatively simple change such as narrowing the upper limit of the tolerance band
and/or removing the opportunity for institutions to migrate back within the contract
range. Either of these measures would result in institutions being more rapidly subject
to withdrawal of funding if their student recruitment was out of step with historical
resource levels. 
162 Even with what appears to be a relatively modest change to the system, consideration
would need to be given to the potential unintended consequences, and of the effects on
particular institutions (for example, those with a higher proportion of ‘non-traditional’
students). It should also be recognised that under the current funding method there 
are a number of reasons why institutions might find themselves outside the contract
range, which is one reason why there are a number of contract ranges beyond the 
+/-5% in operation across the sector. It could be that a simpler funding method reduces
this element of unpredictability but it is unlikely to eliminate it entirely. 
163 A more radical change might allow for much more significant movement of both
student numbers and the funding associated with these numbers between institutions
– for example, allowing the aggregate resource to change significantly (perhaps by
something like 15%). Such a change could be considered particularly desirable where
the potential for overall growth is limited – essentially recycling numbers within 
the system instead of relying on bids for additional numbers. However, it has been
argued that increased ‘contestability’ for students and the associated funding should
become more of a feature of the system in any future scenario. It is likely that any
increased fluidity in numbers on this or a comparable scale would only be practicable
over a longer period, rather than year-on-year. To ensure quality and sustainability,
universities need time to plan for significant changes in numbers and the associated
effects on, for example, infrastructure and staffing requirements. 
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164 It is unlikely that measures of demand would be appropriate for allocating student
numbers and associated funding, since, under current arrangements, high levels 
of demand can be accompanied by relatively low levels of recruitment. There is no
evidence that the most ‘popular’ institutions, that is, those with the highest proportion
of applicants to places, are most desirous of expansion in student numbers – indeed,
some may seek to maintain or reduce numbers to preserve quality and increase
postgraduate capacity. 
165 This could change, of course, if the maximum graduate contribution were higher, and
particularly if it were, over time, comparable with the fee level for overseas students.
Even if there were some displacement of non-EU with home and EU students, however,
there are likely to be a number of other factors limiting the extent to which some of
these institutions would seek to expand their intake to meet demand. These include:
the balance of teaching and research activity; the desire to protect quality; and practical
constraints imposed by an institution’s physical location.
166 There are other options for moving funding around the system. These include
developing funding incentives for the provision of particular subjects or developing
funding incentives linked to quality. We now consider some of the issues around these. 
b Providing funding incentives for movement of student numbers between subjects
167 The mechanism developed for 2010–11to reward institutions shifting the balance 
of their provision towards strategically important and vulnerable subjects (SIVS) could
be extended. HEFCE has suggested that it ‘may subsequently offer this funding to more
subjects following further engagement with government and the UK Commission for
Employment and Skills on skills priorities, and the progress of consultation on teaching
funding from 2012–13’.59 In its teaching funding consultation, HEFCE notes that, in
future, such a mechanism could extend to movement of numbers between institutions. 
168 This does, however, raise some important questions about the circumstances under
which such a mechanism could operate effectively. First, it has been developed against
the backdrop of a student number control which many regard as burdensome and
impractical, and which may need to be less rigorous if the student finance system were
put on a more sustainable footing. A similar system could of course be developed under
a less stringent control of numbers by adapting the current funding methodology – for
example, by narrowing the tolerance band and/or introducing additional monitoring of
student numbers. Institutions would also, as now, need to balance the aims of securing
public funding and pursuing strategic objectives, but the flow of funding could be more
responsive to changes deemed to be in the national interest. However, it remains the
case that for this funding to be most efficient as an incentive or reward mechanism,
institutions should be confident that they will be able to deliver the movement of
students for which they have bid, which may be difficult when take-up of offers varies
each year.
169 Second, in order to attract greater funding, this mechanism requires subjects 
deemed strategically important to attract more funding than other subjects. Up until
now, this initiative has focused on subjects in the higher three cost bands but, were 
the market in public value to become more contested (as is likely to be the case, for
example, if a reduced amount of public funding is targeted to ‘strategic’ provision), there
is no guarantee that this would continue, and more explicit funding incentives might
therefore be necessary. Were this mechanism to be expanded significantly, moreover, 
it would also depend on substantial movement out of ‘cheaper’ subjects that could 
in themselves then become more vulnerable – especially given that movement would
be most likely to come from subjects where there was perceived to be least demand. 
At the very least, some consideration would need to be given to the cumulative effects 
of such policies if they continued to focus on a small number of subjects. 
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170 Third, a decision has to be taken about how long additional funding is to be made
available, and what conditions are to be attached to the additional funding. In its
teaching funding consultation HEFCE has indicated a preference for ‘short-term 
and highly-fluid’ funding to promote change. However, there is a difference between
short-term funding that meets short-term policy priorities from which institutions
might be expected to retreat when the funding stream dries up, and short-term funding
that is intended as initial pump priming, but with institutions expected to absorb any
additional costs in the long term. The latter will be the case as long as institutions 
have to make a commitment to continue to fund places in particular subjects but with
no guarantee of additional funding for these places over the same period. In the case 
of this most recent initiative, HEFCE is committing additional funding only for two
further years ‘in principle’ and is expecting institutions to continue recruiting additional
entrants in these subjects beyond this period. Thus institutions would either have 
to find the additional funds from other sources, or find ways of delivering the courses
more cheaply. We note that it may take some time to develop and expand provision 
and a certain degree of stability is desirable to ensure that universities can plan in 
a reasonably long-term manner.
c Linking teaching funding to quality
171 In its Higher Ambitions document the government explicitly suggested that HEFCE 
could seek to direct more funds into subjects of strategic importance by diverting 
funds ‘away from institutions whose courses fail to meet high standards of quality 
or outcomes’.60 This statement could be read either as a desire to strengthen HEFCE’s
existing powers to remove funding from institutions who do not secure confidence
judgements from the QAA,61 or as a desire to increase the movement of public funding
between institutions, based on a system of quality metrics.
172 As the QAA and HEFCE have noted, there is no evidence of systemic failure in the 
quality of the student experience or standards. However, as discussed above, we are
working with HEFCE, GuildHE and QAA to implement a number of improvements to 
the QA system.62
173 We also consider that it is important that the quality assurance system is as
transparent as possible. We are working with the QAA to make their reports easier 
to understand, and their judgements clearer. Universities UK is also working with 
the Higher Education Public Information Steering Group to ensure that the information
for prospective students is as useful and accessible as possible. This is underpinned 
by research with prospective and existing students and will lead to a consultation
(sponsored by Universities UK, HEFCE and GuildHE) in autumn 2010.
174 With respect to the policy of using quality metrics to drive resource allocation, there 
are a number of problems with identifying comparable measures of teaching quality.
The student population is diverse and the form that high quality provision takes will 
vary so long as it reflects this diversity. The precise identification of the value added 
by institutions to students’ outcomes (including career destinations) will always be
problematic. To overcome these issues at a system level would require a bureaucratic
and burdensome process that would detract from the delivery of frontline teaching. 
A version of this has been tried in the past with the Teaching Quality Assessment (TQA)
and with no demonstrable benefit to students or staff that outweighed the increased
effort required. If funding were tied to this form of quality assessment, it could lead 
to unintended behavioural consequences across the sector, as well as a substantial
increase in the burden of regulation.
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I Introduction
175 The total number of the country’s students in HE should reflect as far as possible the
‘Robbins Principle’ that ‘courses of higher education should be available to all those
who are qualified by ability and attainment to pursue them and who wish to do so’. 
We believe that participation should increase to support this aim.
176 However, we also recognise that it is in the collective interest of universities and of
society more broadly that there is some management of the overall call on the state’s
resources, and this should be built on a sustainable system of student finance.
177 We would not want to see a significant erosion of the overall unit of funding per 
student to support expansion, as happened in the 80s and early 90s. It is vital that 
any efficiencies developed across the sector with respect to teaching activities are
sustainable over time and do not negatively impact on the sustainability of other core
activities (for example, research). It will be important that any efficiency ‘benchmarks’
developed through funding initiatives respect the diversity of the sector and the
autonomy of individual institutions. This sustainability will look different at different
institutions, but could be supported by the removal of substantive barriers such as 
the charging of VAT on shared services. Universities UK will, over the coming year, 
play a leading role in developing models for sustainable efficiencies across the sector.
II Controlling and managing growth
178 Experience suggests it will be difficult to design a system of funding appropriate 
to a period where demand significantly exceeds supply which can be used as the basis
of a more durable future funding method, particularly if there is a desire to protect 
as far as possible the overall unit of funding. 
179 The HEFCE funding method from 1992 essentially applied a yearly efficiency saving
across the whole sector, and then allocated funding back to HEIs wanting to expand.
Places were funded at different rates for different HEIs, and HEIs were given expansion
funding at their particular rate. The Maximum Aggregate Student Number (MASN)
control was introduced to limit growth – essentially to limit the extent of the reduction 
in the unit of funding from continued expansion within the same resource envelope. 
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4 Managing overall student numbers 
The key principle that we believe should guide the overall level of participation
The difficulties associated with managing growth in numbers where resources 
are constrained and demand is high
The potential issues with allowing growth to be delivered through ‘efficiency 
savings’ applied to the sector
Our conclusion that some management of the overall call on the state’s resources
remains desirable, but that a more sustainable student finance system should 
allow for some relaxation of the stringent controls currently in place
Part 4 of this 
section sets out:
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180 In 1998 a funding method was developed which allowed institutions to bid for additional
numbers without a reduction in the unit of funding. This was at a time when the annual
cash and resource cost of student support (including fee waivers for lower income
students) was around £1bn less than it is currently, and when the overall size of the loan
book was significantly smaller, due to the absence of tuition fee loans. This institutional
funding methodology remained in place once variable fees had been introduced. 
Up until 2009–10, HEIs were permitted a relatively high degree of freedom in managing
their student numbers – the tolerance band mechanism allowed institutions some
freedom to move numbers between publicly-funded student types, even if this had the
effect of increasing the number of students eligible for full-time student support. The
current ‘student number control,’ which restricts institutions’ full-time undergraduate
intake, is explicitly designed to limit the call on government student support.63
181 It has been argued that this student number control, based on entrants rather than
total numbers, is, on balance, a reasonable scenario for the sector as a whole in 
the short term. It still permits some flexibility for institutions – allowing a shift in the
balance of their subject provision for undergraduate entrants within the tolerance 
band limits. Moreover, government policies have helped ensure that overall full-time
home and EU undergraduate entrants increased in 2007, 2008 and 2009, and may
increase further in 2010 (depending on the outcome of the University Modernisation
Fund initiative). Thus, at a sector level, the control itself is unlikely to reduce the 
overall number of full-time students in higher education in the next few years. 
182 However, it needs to be accepted that this may not be the case at individual institution
level – for example, if a university has a high graduating cohort in comparison with 
its 2008–09 entrants its overall size will shrink. In addition, since the student number
control has been introduced alongside the tolerance band system, it means some
institutions have been faced with a choice between fines for over-recruitment 
and permanent loss of grant. There are also a number of practical difficulties in exactly
meeting admissions targets, which are more pronounced for particular institutions 
and courses.
183 The University Modernisation Fund is also worthy of comment. This fund will provide
20,000 extra places for 2010–11, 10,000 of which are full-time. These funded places
follow a pattern established with the ‘unfunded’ places in 2009–10 – restriction 
to subjects seen to be most important for the future economic strength of the country,
in line with the New Industry, New Jobs (NINJ) agenda and with clear directives 
on mode of study to be supported.64 A critical new dimension of this is that successful
institutions must commit to invest part of the funding in efficiency measures, and 
to demonstrate that they have delivered savings sufficient to sustain these places in
future years. Institutions will, moreover, have only one year in which to deliver
additional numbers. 
184 Since universities will be free to decide whether to bid for these places or not, 
the immediate outcomes of this process are difficult to foresee.65 Whatever the 
short-term outcomes, however, important long-term questions remain concerning
how the efficiencies secured should be used to judge the potential for broader, 
more sustainable change in practices across the sector. Specifically, as HEFCE 
has noted in its guidance, there is a need to ensure that efficiencies are appropriate 
to individual institutions. It is not clear whether the efficiency savings identified by 
the universities that opt in to this initiative will be appropriate for wholesale extension
across the sector.
185 Looking forward, it is not clear whether a future government will set a target for 
growth in participation or the amount it is prepared to spend on higher education. 
If either of these limits were clearly articulated, then, in order for the Robbins 
Principle not to be undermined, a clear set of financing and study options would need 
to be available and practically deliverable. One danger to be avoided is a short-term
assessment of skills needs – the lifetime benefits to the student of having a degree 
and to society of having a high level of skills in its working-age population should 
be remembered.
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186 A more sustainable student support system (discussed above) should, however, ensure
that the call which students make on the state’s resources is more predictable and
manageable than it is at present. In particular, it may mean that the rigorous student
number control currently in place could be relaxed. 
187 Building further growth on a sustainable system of funding is preferable to other
options, such as encouraging institutions to recruit some publicly-fundable students 
on a ‘full fee’ basis.66 Since public support for these students would be limited in 
some way67, a policy of this kind would appear to offer maximum choice to those with
the ability to pay. Such a policy is especially vulnerable to changes in the political
environment, particularly if the level of demand begins to shrink back. The introduction
of this ‘full fee’ provision to address a short-term crisis in demand could therefore
create problems in future.68
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1 In light of short-term pressures and longer-term trends, how do your proposals for
reform ensure the sustainability of the higher education system as a whole?
188 The English higher education system as a whole remains underfunded by historical 
and international comparison, and there are several key areas of the student teaching
and learning environment where ‘sustainability gaps’ have already been identified. 
To address this, further investment in the system is needed. The recent policy 
history, and the public funding environment over the medium term, suggest that 
any substantive increase will have to be through a higher graduate contribution. 
189 We have already demonstrated the uses to which universities have put the income 
from fees received since 2006 to improve the student experience through investment 
in, for example, teaching infrastructure, support services and staff. In addition we 
have asked some of our member institutions to identify their specific priorities for
investment if additional income were available. 
190 We recognise the drive for universities to ‘invest to save’ in the current economic
climate. In looking at how this might apply to the delivery of teaching, we will need 
to be confident that any efficiencies can be achieved without damaging the aggregate
contribution universities make in other areas. Material changes, such as a removal 
of the VAT barriers to developing shared services, may be required to ensure this.
191 We have proposed reforms to the government-backed loan system that we believe
would make this system more sustainable, and reduce the pressures that have 
recently led to cuts to frontline teaching resources. Our proposals would maintain 
the progressive elements of the current system (income contingent repayments and 
a maximum period of liability, which are beneficial to those with low lifetime earnings,
and especially to women) but significantly reduce the interest subsidy (which mainly
benefits higher earning graduates in mid-career). 
192 For the reasons we outline, an optimal scenario would be to continue to have 
a government-backed loan scheme to support graduate contributions up to a regulated
maximum. However we recognise that, even if the public subsidy for loans is reduced,
the availability of government-backed loans may not be sufficient to ensure the sector
remains globally competitive over the long term, and to underpin the continuation 
of high quality provision. 
193 We have discussed suggested options for developing a future framework that would
allow a maximum graduate contribution level to be set beyond the level for which
guaranteed government-backed loans are available. This would involve institutions
themselves increasing their stake in the student finance system in some way. We have
outlined the careful consideration that would need to be given to any possible models,
in order to avoid unintended negative consequences and inequitable levels of risk for
students, graduates and institutions. We are of the firm view that these issues would
need to be addressed in any further development of such models. 
194 We have affirmed our support for the continuation of a public funding method that takes
some account of the alternative sources of teaching income available to institutions,
and we will consider these issues more fully in our response to the HEFCE teaching
funding consultation. However, due account should be taken of the effect of any
significant changes in the public funding available to particular institutions, because 
of the effect on students and alumni.  
195 We will continue to work with the sector to develop and embed appropriate costing
methodologies for teaching that can inform the public funding method.
196 We propose that existing capacity building initiatives to support institutions across 
the sector in developing relationships with employers be maintained and developed.
Section 3
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197 Whilst we recognise that economic change makes predicting the future effects of policy
changes difficult, we believe the government should commit to assessing the effects 
of any policy changes on all parts of the HE funding and finance system. we would not
want to see a situation in future where changes to the student support system are
introduced without due consideration of the likely effect on the HE budget as a whole,
and on the sector’s ability to meet student demand.
198 Our proposals relate to the English HE system. We recognise that they could lead 
to further differentiation between the funding structures in England and those 
in the devolved administrations, and, potentially could create budgetary pressures 
here, if these administrations seek to support their students’ participation in English
universities. We reiterate the statement in our first submission that the Review 
team should be cognisant of the impact of any recommendations upon the devolved
regions in developing their recommendations, and that appropriate communications
with the officials of the Welsh Assembly government and the Scottish Executive 
should be maintained. 
In summary, we would seek the following outcomes: 
199 For students: Increased investment in the learning environment; continuation 
of a guaranteed package of government support; potential shift in the balance 
of government support towards cash expenditure on grants and away from resource 
costs of loans; maximum choice – the option of upfront payment of the contribution
towards tuition remains.
200 For graduates: Continuation of the progressive features of the current loan scheme.
201 For universities: The potential for increased graduate contributions; greater freedom 
to collaborate and draw on sector experience to deliver sustainable efficiencies.
202 For government: Reduction in the resource cost of loans, with the potential to increase
the size of the overall loan book; potential enhanced role for private finance as more 
of the risk is covered by the cohort of borrowers.
2 What type of mechanism should be used to drive up quality, efficiency and 
innovation in the UK HE system, and what metrics should be used to assess 
quality improvements?
203 We have demonstrated clear links between recent levels of investment in the system
and improvements in the quality of the student experience.69 Conversely, further
improvements to this student experience may be at risk (in an increasingly competitive
global environment) if we do not continue to invest.
204 An increase in the funding available for frontline teaching and learning should be 
a priority. Therefore our proposals suggest we should not reintroduce a national 
system of teaching quality assessment that implies a significant bureaucratic cost 
and burden for institutions, especially given the relatively recent experience which
pointed to the limited benefits, relative to cost, of such a system. This would effectively
rule out any system of institutional funding based on a complex system of quality 
or outcome ‘metrics’.  
205 Quality assurance arrangements should continue to reflect the autonomy of institutions
and should build on current levels of student engagement. There is more work to 
be done to improve communication of the outcomes of audits to the wider public, and 
to improve communication of how threshold standards are ensured. We are working
closely with the QAA and others on this. We are also leading on enhancing the external
examining system, and will, together with GuildHE, deliver concrete recommendations
for improvements by December 2010.
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206 Prospective students should be able to access appropriate information to exercise
informed choice. Whilst a considerable amount of data is already published by 
subject and institution (relating, for example, to continuation rates, class of degree, 
and employment destinations), we are committed to the development of comparable
information to allow students to exercise informed judgements. Universities UK 
is pleased to be jointly sponsoring a consultation on public information in higher
education in autumn 2010. This consultation will be informed by research
commissioned by HEFCE asking students and prospective students what information
they require about Higher Education in order to inform their choices, and how they 
wish to access this information. Preliminary results suggest key issues may be 
related to the accessibility of this information, and to the operation of the information,
advice and guidance (IAG) system more widely.
207 Our proposals are underpinned by a belief that the increase in student expectations 
is a positive development for the sector as a whole, since it is likely to act as 
a driver to enhance the quality of provision. We support the efforts of individual
institutions and sector-wide groups to identify investment needs, and to ensure
effective communication of the provision students can expect from their courses. 
208 We have argued that the delivery of public funding through a block grant also drives
quality – it supports the strategic investment by institutions in the learning and 
teaching environment, in ways that are appropriate to their various missions, enables
universities to innovate, take risks and cross-subsidise in the strategic interest of the
institution, and in the interests of current and future students. 
209 Such funding should continue to be weighted for higher cost subjects, and to reflect 
the higher costs associated with particular groups of students, in order to remove
disincentives to particular types of provision – there will remain a role for government
via HEFCE in supporting this.
210 The system already demonstrates considerable dynamism and innovation in
responding to the needs of students, employers and society. We propose that support
for this dynamism should be maintained, and perhaps enhanced, but without causing
volatility in funding that might threaten, for example, provision in geographic or subject
areas which become temporarily unpopular. Capacity in higher education takes time 
to build up and once lost can be difficult to recover. Some ‘smoothing’ may continue 
to be necessary in the interests of students and the UK as a whole. 
211 As the balance of public and private funding continues to shift, the regulatory and
accountability framework we have at present can be expected to evolve. But there
remains a strong public interest element in universities, regardless of the way they 
are funded (for example, because of their role in promoting social mobility and the
international reputation of the UK), and there will need to be some form of appropriate
regulation to ensure this. We would support models that incorporated a significant
ongoing role for institutions themselves as part of the dialogue between HEFCE,
government and universities.
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In summary, we would seek the following outcomes:
212 For students: Frontline teaching and learning resource protected and enhanced 
as far as possible; improvements in access to information allow for appropriate
comparisons between courses; enhanced engagement in quality assurance; receive
appropriate assurances from their institution about the provision they can expect.
213 For universities: Continued commitment to strengthen the quality assurance system, 
in order to make it more robust and outward-facing; ensure appropriate reassurance
about threshold levels of standards, while retaining the centrality of institutional
autonomy; support quality enhancement.
214 For government: Provide public funding to underpin the excellence of the system 
as a whole; maintain the capacity to remove disincentives to provision in some subjects. 
3 What type/s of participation will be important to incentivise in future, and how 
should this be achieved without compromising quality and sustainability?
215 The level and breadth of participation in the sector should reflect the role of universities
in driving social mobility and economic growth.  
216 Demographic projections suggest a continued strong demand for higher education
from the young population, and economic/skills projections suggest a strong demand
for graduates in the job market. 
217 An urgent priority is the development of a sustainable system for funding full-time
undergraduate provision, where qualified demand is currently demonstrably strong.
But we propose a rolling programme of reforms that will support the development 
of more flexible provision which best meets the needs of students and the economy. 
218 We propose that practical steps are taken now to identify the cohort of part-time
students for whom an extension of student support would be of the greatest benefit,
and then to develop ways of most effectively extending this support as a matter 
of priority. 
219 Strong consideration should be given to extending the support available for taught
postgraduate students, both full-time and part-time. This is especially so in light 
of the economic importance of this group of students, and also to address issues of 
fair access. 
220 There is a clear danger in expansion without appropriate resource. Universities UK
welcomes the additional funding for universities secured in the recent budget, but 
it will be important to ensure that the use of any efficiency ‘benchmarks’ pays sufficient
attention to the diversity and autonomy of institutions in the sector.
In summary, we would seek the following outcomes:
221 For students: Help to ensure universities are able to respond to student demand;
improve the support available for a wider range of study options. 
222 For universities: Support the evolution of their provision in response to student demand
and the needs of the economy and society. 
223 For government: Take a broad ranging view of the value of graduates in the economy;
recognise the limitations of workforce planning.  
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4 How would fair access be promoted and enforced in the higher education system 
you propose?
224 The principle that home and EU graduates of full-time undergraduate courses 
should be able to access higher education free at the point of use would be maintained.
An expansion of loans to support a graduate contribution for other groups of students
would further embed this principle.
225 We would prioritise a change in language – from tuition fees to a graduate 
contribution – and a coordinated communication campaign to accompany this.
226 It is difficult to predict the changes in participation that might occur if the system is
reformed. As such, it is important that a rolling programme of reforms is proposed 
(so, for example, we suggest fundamental changes to the availability of grants 
are not made at the same time as changes to the terms of student loans). Similarly,
government should retain the ability to set the maximum level of the graduate
contribution, which can be assessed against participation trends over time.
227 A future system should support universities in investing a range of resources –
including donations from alumni – in both access and financial aid initiatives, 
and the location of these initiatives within a broader access strategy. The current
requirement placed on universities to provide bursaries at a minimum level 
should therefore be removed.
228 We propose that the potential effects (in isolation and in combination) of any reforms 
to student finance and institutional funding on a wide range of publicly-funded students
should be considered, in order to protect participation and the overall quality of the
student experience across the sector. 
In summary, we would seek the following outcomes:
229 For students: Further embed the principle that higher education is free at the point 
of use; continued expectation of some financial support for living costs.
230 For universities: Support the embedding of access initiatives and financial aid as 
part of a broader recruitment strategy; build on existing work in providing students 
with information on financial support. 
231 For government: Retain the ability to set a maximum graduate contribution and 
to target financial support for widening participation policies through public funding
and direct student support.
Universities UK Submission to the Independent Review of HE Funding and Student Finance
Some of the recent and forthcoming Universities UK publications that are 
particularly relevant to this submission are listed below. These are referenced in the
text as appropriate.
1 Universities UK’s response to the Independent Review of Student Higher Education Funding
and Student Finance – Call for Evidence
January 2010
www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/PolicyAndResearch/PolicyAreas/Documents/
Independent%20Review%20of%20Funding%20and%20Student%20Finance%20
First%20call%20submission.pdf
2 Making it count: How universities are using income from variable fees
Universities UK, January 2010
www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/Publications/Pages/Makingitcount.aspx
3 Variable tuition fees in England: assessing their impact on students and higher 
education institutions: a fourth report
Universities UK, December 2009
www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/Publications/Pages/VariabletuitionfeesinEngland4.aspx
4 The impact of universities on the UK economy
Universities UK, November 2009
www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/Publications/Pages/ImpactOfUniversities4.aspx
5 The growth of private and for-profit higher education providers in the UK
Universities UK, March 2010
www.universitiesuk.ac.uk/Publications/Pages/Privateandforprofitproviders.aspx
6 The supply of part-time provision in higher education in the UK [Working title]
Universities UK, forthcoming
7 The social benefits of going to university: a literature review [Working title]
Universities UK, forthcoming
Annex
Relevant Universities UK publications
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